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CHANGING THE BATHWATER AND KEEPING THE BABY: 1 

EXPLORING NEW WAYS OF EVALUATING INTENT IN 

ENVIRONMENTAL DISCRIMINATION CASES 

BROWNE C. LEWIS* 
ABSTRACT 
Minorities in the United States live in areas that are heavily polluted. In 
addition to dealing vi:ith the pollution generated by their neighborhoods, 
minorities often are exposed to environmental hazards that provide services 
for the entire community. The problem of the disproportionate placement of 
environn1ental haz.ards in minority communities is well documented. A 
primary cause of the inequitable distribution of environmental hazards in this 
country is environmental discrimination based on class and race. 
Persons combating environmental discrimination have attempted to get 
relief relying upon the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Unfortunately, plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases have hit a brick 
wall-the requirement that they prove the decision to place the environmental 
hazard in their neighborhood lo/"as motivated by an intent to discriminate on the 
part of the decision-makers. In response, advocates have proposed replacing 
intent as the evidentiary requirement in Equal Protection Cases. If properly 
applied, the intent requirement is a perfectly viable evidentiary method. 
Therefore, I propose keeping the intent requirement and changing the manner 
I This title is a twist on the proverb: "Don't throw the baby out with the bathwater." There 
is so1ne controversy surrounding the origin of the proverb. The following is one view: 
Baths equaled a big tub filled with hot water. The man of the house had the privilege of 
the: nice clean water, then all the other sons and men, then the women and finally the 
children. Last of all the babies. By then the water was so dirty you could actually lose 
someone in it. Hence the saying, ''Don't throw the baby out with the bath water." 
More Eccentricities of the English Language,http:/lwww.wordskit.com/language/legend<;/ 
bathwatcr.shtml (lase visited Feb. 9, 2005). 
* Assis1ant Professor, University of Detroit Mercy Schoo! of Law, B.A., Grambling State 
University, J.D., University of Minnesota, L.L.M., Energy & Environmental Law, University of 
Houston, M.P.A., Hubert H. Humphrey lnstitutc of Public Affairs. I would like to thank the 
following persons for their assistance in the preparation of this article: Professor Pamela Wilkins, 
Professor Robin Magee, Professor lmani Perry, Professor Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Professor 
Canulle Nelson, Professor Bernie D. Jones, Dean Mark Gordon, Urooj Usman, and Melodee 
Henderson. 
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in which the courts determine if the plaintiffs have satisfied the requirement. 
The courts should presume intent if the plaintiffs are able to demonstrate that 
the decision to place the environmental hazard in their neighborhood was 
unreasonable. 
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lr\TRODUCTION 
Given the United States' legacy of discriminatory activity, in Professor 
Robert D. Bullard's2 opinion, it is not surprising that the country's 
environmental laws, regulations, and policies have not been consistently 
applied across all sectors of the populace. For instance, low-income families 
and minorities are forced to tolerate an unequal burden of the country's 
"pollution problems." Consequently, persons in those communities are 
exposed to the public health threat~ that accompany environmental hazards.3 
Professor Bullard was one of the fir~t per~ons to write about the rampant 
environmental discrimination in the United States. According to Professor 
Bullard, the current environmental protection regime is designed to provide 
greater benefits and protection for white persons living in middle- and upper­
income communities while allocating costs to low-income and minority 
persons. 4 Therefore, Professor Bullard and others advocate reconstructing the 
current environmental protection regime to address the issue of environmental 
discrimination.·' 
For years, governmental decision-makers have contributed to the 
disproportionate placeinent of environmental hazards in low-income6 and 
2. Hullard is one of the leading e~perts in the field of environn1ental JU>\1ee. He was one of 
the planners of the f.irst Nutional People of Color Environn1ental l.caderslnp Sumn1i1. 
1. Rohen ])_ Hullard. ln1rodu(:/1un to UNl".QUAL l'ROTECTIOJ\: E'.\VIRUNM~....-TAL 1U5TJCE 
AND COMMUNITIES OF COLOR, at xv, vv (Rohert D. Bullard ed., 1994) [hereinafter LTJ\EQlJAL 
PROTECTION]. 
4. Id. at xv-xvi. 
5. Hullard states. 
[T]hc dorninant environ•nental protection paradign1 (1) instinnionali7e> unequal 
enforcement; (2) trades hurnan health for profit; (3) places the hurden of proof on the 
"victim<;." not on the polluting indu<;try: (4) legitimates hurnan exposure to harmful 
chemicals, pc-.ticidcs, and hazardous -;uhstances; (5) promotes "nsky" technologies, such 
as incinerator-.; (6) exploit-. the imlnerahihty of economically and poht1cally 
disenfranchised com1nunilies. (7) >ubs1<l1leS ecological dc<;truction: (8) creates an 
industry around risk a1>e;;rnent; (9) delays cleanup actions; and (10) fails to develop 
pollution prc;cntion as the overarching and dominant strategy. 
Id. at xvi 
6. \Vhcn dealing with environmental justice i'>sucs, advocates have identified the low­
incorne populauon in an affected area by u;ing the annual statistical poveny thrc<;holds from the 
Hureau of the Censu;'; Current Population Reports. Series P-60 on Income and Poverty. See 
COUJ\Cll. ON E:-!VT. QUALITY, EXEC. 0!"TICF Of' THE l'RFS!DENT, EJ\V!RONMENTAL JL:STlCE: 
Gt}JDANCJ: UND!-'R THE NATIUJ\/\L ENVJRU:-IMENTAI. POLICY ACT 25 (1997). available at 
http://www.v..Tt.doc.gov/envju'>ticc/pdf/ justicc.pdf [hercinafier CEQ GUIDllNCFI. However, for 
the purpo;e of clanty, I am u<;ing the term a' defined in the housing area A "low-income farnily" 
11 a farni!y that has incon1e that doc;, not exceed 80 percent of the median income for the area 
v..·h~re the family reside~. 42 L:.s.C. § 1437(b)(2) (2000). 
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m1nonty communities. Environ111cntal discrin1ination based upon class and 
race i~ one possible cause of the unequal distribution of environmental hazards. 
The recognition that low-income and minority persons have been unequally 
treated in the environmental protection arena led to the development of the 
environmental justice movcn1ent.9 "Environmental justice" is the term used to 
refer to the steps that have been taken to remedy environmental 
discrimination. 10 Persons discussing the problem of the disproportionate 
place1nent of environmental hazard~ in low-income and minority 
neighborhoods have also used the terms "environrnental racis1n" 11 and 
7. In the environrncnlalju>tice arena, the term "m1nori1{' i-, used to refer to the following 
four major racial and ethnic groups. (1) Blacks. (2) American Indian; and Alaska Kative;, (3) 
Asian> and Pacific Islanders. and (4) Hispanics. CEQ GUIDAJ\'CE, supra note 6, at 25. In the 
context of this Artide. "nllnority populations" broadly refers to all persons except non-Hispanic 
whites. See U.S. GEJ\'. ACCOUNTJl>.'G 0FHCF, GAO/RCED-95-84, HA:tARDUU5 A:-!D 
NUNHA:tARDUUS WAS-IE: DEMOGRAPHICS Of PEOPLE LJVl:-!G N!·.AR WASTL FACJLIIII~~ 17 n.2 
(June 1995). availah/e at http://www.gao.gov/archi ve/J 995/re95084.pdf [hereinafter 
(iAOIRCJ---JJ-95-84]_ 
8. In this Article, I use lhc lenn "cn;ironrnental haLanh'' to refer lo projeds that pollute the 
environrncnt and those that ha;e the potential to pollute. 
9. The United Slates Env1ronn1ental Protection Agency {EPA) defines cnvironrnental 
ju~riee as: 
The fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regard!e;,;, of race, color, 
national origin. or income with re;pcct to the development, implernenlation, mid 
enforce1nent of environrnenlal laws, regulations, and policies. !'air treattncnt means that 
no group of people, indud1ng racial, ethnic, or socioeconotnic group should bear a 
disproportionate share of the negative environmental consequences resulting from 
indu<;1rial, municipal, and commercial operations or the execution of federal, state, lucal, 
and rrihal program~ and policic<;_ 
[NVTL. PROT AG!o:-!CY, Fr:>AL GlJIDAJ\C!: FOR INCORPORATING E"1VIROJ\'MENTAL JUSTICE 
CONCERNS !:-! EPA'S NEPA COMPLIA:-!CE ANALYSES § 1 1.1 (Apr. 1998). availahle al 
hllp .//www .epa.gov/comphance/resources/pohc1es/ej/ej_guidancc _ ncpa _ epa0498_pdf l hcrci naftcr 
EPA GUlDAJ\'CE], see also Envtl. Prol. Agency, Evironmcntal Justice, http://www.cpa.gov/ 
crnnplianccJenvironmental justice (last visited Oct. 6. 2005). 
10_ Major Willie A_ Gunn, From thr: f,,,ndflll to the Other Side of the Tracks: Developing 
lc'mpowerrnent Strategie.1 to Al/evrale t:nwronmental lnju.nice, 2201!101'".U. L. REV 1227, 1235 
(1996) (citing Exec. Order No. 12,898, 3 C.F.R. 859 (1995), reprin1ed in 42 U.S C_ § 4321 
(1994)). 
11 The knn "enviruna1ental raci>m'' was invented hy Dr_ Benjamin Chavis, Jr. in 1982. lie 
defined the tcrn1 a5: 
racial di;crimination in environmental policy[-]mak1ng and the unequal enforcetncnt of 
envaonmcntal la\11s and regulations_ It 1~ the deliberate targeting of people of color 
con1n1un1t1e~ for luxic wa~te facilities and the official sanctioning of a life threatening 
prc5cnce of poisons and pollutants in people of color communitie-.. It is also manifested 
in the history of excluding people of color from the leadership of the environnicntal 
nio;e1nent. 
Robert M. Frye, l~nviro111nental l!ijUStlce: The Failure of AmPncan Civil Rig/us and 
Environmental Law to Provide Equal Protection fram Pollut1on, :l DIC:K J_ EJ\YTL.. L. & POL'Y 
53, 56 (1993) (quoting Environmental Raci:,·m: Hearings Before the House Subconun. on Civil 
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"environmental equity." 12 In this Article, the tenn "environmental 
discrimination" is used to refer to the practice of disproportionately locating 
environmental hazards in low-income and minority communities. The core 
premise of this Article focuses on the use of the Equal Protection Clause to 
combat environmental discrimination. Thus, I will be dealing exclusively with 
the location of environmental hazards in minority communities. 
After an environmental hazard has been placed in a minority community, 
the residents might not feel the negative impact for several years. Whenever 
the members of a community experience adverse consequences because of an 
environmental hazard, persons seeking to help them typically have three main 
objectives. The first goal is to have the environmental hazard put out of 
operation. 13 The second goal is to receive compensation for persons who have 
been injured by the environmental hazard. 14 The final goal is to prevent new 
environmental hazards from being placed 1n and near the impacted 
community. 15 When the persons affected are minorities, one of the primary 
tools advocates have attempted to use to achieve their goals is the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 16 
A substantial amount of evidence shows that federal, state, and local 
governmental decision-makers have permitted a disproportionate number of 
environmental hazards, including hazardous waste incinerators and harmful 
and Cnn.1titutinnal Rights. 103d Cong., 1st Se~s. (Mar. 3, 1993) (testimony of Dr. Benjamin F. 
Chavis. Jr.. Executive Director. United Church of Christ Commission for Racial JuSlice); see also 
Rev. Benjamin F. Chavis, Jr., Foreword to CONFRONTING ENVIRONMENTAL RACISM: VOICES 
FROM THE GRASSROOTS 3, 3 (Robert D. Bullard ed .. 1993) [hereinafter GRASSROOTS]. 
12. The term "environmental equity" has been used by the EPA to refer to "the distribution 
and effects of environmental problem~ and the policies and processes to reduce differences in 
who bears environmental risks." ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING 
RISK RJR ALL COMMUNITIES 2 (1992), available at http:f/www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/ 
publicalions/ej/reducing_risk_com_voll.pdf [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY]. According 
to its workgroup report. the EPA used the tcnn because "'it most readily lends itself to scientific 
risk analysis." Id. 
13. See ROBERT 0. BULLARD, DUMPING IN DIXIE: RACE, CLASS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
QUALITY 49 ( l 990) (discussing how members of a predontinantly minority community organized 
to have a lead smelter put out of operation). 
14. Id. at 44 (discussing how minority residents organized to ha!t the construction of a 
landfill in their subdivision). 
15. Kathy Seward Northern, Bauery and Beyond: A Tort Ww Response to Environn1ental 
Racism, 21 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 485. 535 (1997); see also Kirsten H. Engel, 
Brownfield Initiatives and Environnienta/ Justice: Second-Class Cleanup.> nr Marke1-Ba.1ed 
Equity?, 13 J. NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 317, 329 (1997-1998) (discussing attempts by 
persons combating environmental discnminat1on to get "legislative moratoriums" passed to 
prevent the placement of additional environmental hazards in minority cornrnunities that are 
already over-saturated with pollution-generating activities). 
16. U.S. CONST. AMEND. XIV,§ 1 
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industrial processes, to be placed 1n minority communities. 17 Governmental 
authorities also have been remiss in enforcing environmental regulations in 
those communities. 18 As a consequence of this apparent unequal treatment 
under the law, advocates have attempted to use the Equal Protection Clause to 
challenge the placement of environmental hazards in minority communities on 
the ground that the government decision-maker was racially discriminatory in 
approving the activity. 19 
Environmental discrimination cases have been largely unsuccessful 
because plaintiffs have been unable to prove discriminatory intent on the part 
of the decision-maker.20 Jn the absence of negligence, persons usually are only 
legally accountable for their intentional actions. Hence, discriminatory intent 
should not be replaced as the standard of proof in environmental discrimination 
cases. Nonetheless, fairness dictates that the manner in which the courts 
evaluate whether or not the intent requirement has been met should be 
modified. Under the current system, even after proving disparate impact, in 
order to satisfy the intent requirement, a plaintiff must prove that the decision­
maker's action was motivated by an intent to discriminate.211nstead of 
mandatory proof of conscious, purposeful discriminatory intent, the court 
should analyze the facts to see if there is a valid reason to presume 
discriminatory intent on the part of the decision-maker. 
This paper is divided into four parts. Part one consists of a general 
overview of the problem of environmental discrimination. Part two gives a 
brief discussion of relevant Equal Protection jurisprudence. The section begins 
with a summary of general Equal Protection law. Then, the section analyzes 
the primary cases that established the foundation of modem-day Equal 
Protection doctrine. Part three examines the current application of the intent 
requirement in environmental discrimination cases. To that end, the section 
reviews the outcome of three of the early environmental discrimination cases, 
and speculates about the components that are necessary to prepare a successful 
Equal Protection challenge in the environmental arena. Part four consists of an 
extensive analysis of the debate over the validity of the intent requirement. 
The section starts by encapsulating a few of the proposed theories put forth to 
replace or modify the intent requirement. The section ends with my suggestion 
for refining the current application of the intent standard to make the process 
fairer to the plaintiffs in environmental discrimination cases. 
17. Northem,supranotel5,at535. 
18. Id. 
19. M. Patrice Benford, Note, Life, Liberry & rhe Pursuit of Clean Air: Fighr for 
En~·ironmental Equality, 20 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 269, 275 (1995); see also R.1.S.E., Inc. v. 
Kay, 768 F. Supp 1144, I 149 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
20. See Pan II, infra, for a discussion of the three key environmental discrimination cases 
that proves this assertion. 
21. R.l.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at 1149. 
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I. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
The problem of environmental discrimination has been documented in 
several studies and discussed in numerous books and law review articles. 
Therefore, I only will briefly highlight the information contained in those 
sources. 
After a protest by black residents in Warren County, North Carolina,22 the 
United States General Accounting Office (GAO) sponsored a study to 
determine the extent of environmental discrimination in America.23 As a result 
of its observations, the GAO concluded that a correlation existed between the 
decisions to place hazardous waste landfills in an area and the race and income 
level of the people living in the area.24 
Governmental agencies were not the only organizations concerned about 
the adverse impact environmental hazards had on low-income and minority 
persons. In 1987, the United Church of Christ (UCC) did its own analysis of 
the problcm. 25After analyzing all of the data, the UCC determined that race, 
not socioeconomic status, accounted for the fact that certain communities in 
the United States had more hazardous waste facilities than other 
communities.2~ 
22. In 1982, a coalition of c1~11 rights groups protested the place1ncnt or a landfill in a hlack 
county See Gunn, supra note 10, at 1228 (citing Marcia Coyle, When Moven1enrs Coalesce, 
NAT.I. L J_, Sept. 21, l\192, at SIO.) 
23. As a part of the information-gathering proce<;<;, GAO staff n1ct with an official of the 
Southern Christian Leallership Conference to d1~cu<;s racial issues ,,urrounlling selection of the 
Warren County PCB lanllfill site. GE;.;. ACCOUNTING OFFICI".. GAO/RCED-83-168, SITING OF 
1-IAZARDOUS W>\STI'. l.ANDl'ILLS >\J\!J THE!R CORRELATION WITH RACIAL A:-<D EcO:-!OMIC 
STATUS or SllRROlJNDIJ\G CO\l'lltl;:-irrrEs 2 (1983) [hereinafter GAO!RCED-83-168] The 
panicipanL'> in the study examined landfills in the eight st:iles that eornposc EPA's Region IV 
(Alabarna, f'lorida, Gcorg1:i, Kentucky, Miss1s~ippi, North Carolina. South Carolina, and 
Tennessee). Id. 
24 ENVIRO;-.;M!-.1'TAL E(.llJITY, :iupru note 12, ~ 2.2.l (citing GAO!RCED-83-168. _1upra 
note 23). The person> conducting the study Lliscovercd that three or the four co1nmercial 
hazardous waste facilitie> in the region were in predo1ninatdy African Arnerican comrnun1ties 
and lhe fourth was in a low-incon1e com1nuni1y. GAO/RCED-83-168, oupra note 23, at l 
furthermore, at least twenty-six percent of the population living in all four communitie> had 
incomes helow the poverty level. Id. African Amencans niade up the majority of the persons 
living in po>erty. Id. 
25. A~ a part of the stully, the UCC examined RCRA corn1nereial ha~.ardous waste facilities 
across the country. GAO/RCED-95-84, supra note 7, at 14 (citing CUMM'N 1-'0R RACIAL 
1CSTICE, UNITED CHURCH 01-' CHRIST, TOXIC WASTES AND RACE IN THI". Ui.·1TED STATES: A 
NATIONAL REPORT U:-< THI' RACIAL AND SOCIOEC01''0)..flC CHARACT!'.RJSTICS or COMMlJJ\ITIES 
\\'ITH HAZARDOUS WA5TI". S!TFS (1987) !hereinafter UCC STCDY]); see a/;o BULLARD, supra 
note 13, at 17. The LCC '1udy was more comprehensive than the GAO report because the 
analyst~ focusell on the entire United States. See Frye. ,,·upra note 11. al 59. 
26. According lo the CCC':< report, communities with a single ha7ardous waste facility had 
twice as many people of color a> did communities without <;uch a facility_ UCC STLDY. ,1upra 
note 25, at :<iii. cited in Northern, .>upru note 15, at 500. In alld1t1on, the stully reportell lhal 
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The GAO and CCC repons spawned con~idcrable debate about the 
inequitable distribution of environ1nental hazards. For exa1nple, in 1990, at a 
conference held at the University of Michigan, participants presented various 
report~ studying the distribution of environmental hazards by race and 
incorne.27 Afterwards, the conference metnbers gave the information co1npilcd 
at the conference to then-EPA Adrninistrator William Reilly and urged the 
agency to conduct an internal investigation into the rnatter. 28 
In l 992. a study published by the National Law Journal (NLJ) reported that 
the EPA consi~tently \Va~ negligent in it.~ enforcement effort~ in low-1neo1ne 
and minority comniunities. 29 The NU study was based upon finding~ from an 
eight-n1onth investigation that focu~ed on the connection between race and 
socioeconornic status and the enforcement of environmental law.'0 The NU 
reviewed every environrnental lawsuit filed in the seven years preceding the 
study illld every residential toxic waste site included in the Superfund 
11 program.· 
Like any form of discrimination, environ1nental discrimination ha~ been 
acknowledged as a n1ajor problein.-12 Legal scholar~ and persons seeking to 
combat environ1nental discri1nination have suggested different solutions to the 
problem. 33 The next part of the paper deals with the utility of the Equal 
cou1muml1e~ with lwo or rnore facilitie-, had n1ore than three lnncs the population of people of 
color as co1111n11n1t1e., without such .,it..::s. E'\'VTR0!\\-11-.'.\TAL 1-,QUITY, supra nule 12, § 2.2.1. 
27. Paul r>.!ohai & Bunyan Bryant, Fniironniental ln1u.1ti('e. Weii;h1ng Race and C/,,,-, As 
Fa<.loro in the /)istrihution of Ln>·ironnwntal l/r1zards, 63 U. Co1.o. L RFV 92 l, 92] ( l992): ,,·ee 
also Joseph Lro;ic, 1\otc, Finding a Re1nedyfor Lrivironm,.ntal Ju.111ce 11\·ing 42 U.S C .9 1983 to 
Fill in a Title VI Gap, 53 CASE\\' RLS. L. Ri•v. 497, 499 (2002). 
28. ~1oha1 & Bryant, supra note 27, al 499. 
29 . .'iee Claire L. Hasler, Couuncnt, The Propooed En•ironmenui/ Justice Act: '·] Have " 
(Gr,.en) !Jn-'tlm;· 17 C Pl:(i!·T SOl.l!\D L. R~_v_ 417, 425--427 (1994) (discus~ing finding.., of NIJ 
study); see a/_10 Roher! B. Wiygul & Sharon Cl!IT Harrington, J.:nvironmental lu.Hu·e in Rural 
Co111n1unitu•s_ Part One: RCRA, Commututies, and Enwro1unental Ju1111:e, 96 V'1 VA. L. RLV. 
405, 419 (1993 · 1994). 
30. Eileen Gauna, Federal Fnvironmental Citi:;en Provioions: Oh.1tacle.1· and Incentives on 
the Road lo Environmental Ju;tu·e, 22 ECOLQ(;y L.Q. I, 18 (1995). 
31 Marianne Lavelle & Marcia Coyle, Th,, Ft'deral (;,,vernmenl, m /rs CIPanup of 
Hazardous Sites and Its Pursuit of Po/111ter~. Favor~ ~Vh1te Communities over ;\1inonty 
Co1nmunllies finder !environmental Law1· Meant to Provide Equal Pro/Pr:llonfor Al/ Ci1izen.1, A 
National Uiw .fo11nu1l lnvestigalion Has Found, 15 .\IA r'L L.J .. Sept. 21, 1992, at S2. 
32. Alice Kaswan, Fnvironmenltll Ju;tice. Rridgmg the Gap Rerween E11vironmen1ul Laws 
and "Ju.1·/ice," 47 A.\-1. L' L. R~.V. 221, 222 (1997): see a/so Rnb~rt D. Bullard, Anatomy of 
J.:nvirontrlf'ntul Raci1m tl11d the E11v1ronn1ental .fustu:e A1ovenwnt, in (iRASSROOTS, supra note 11, 
at 15-39: C.1 TIM~Hll';s ROHERTS & MLLISSA M. Tor+oLON-\1/E!SS, CHRO"IJCLE.\ ~R0\-1 THE 
l·.t,;v1RO'.\M!o!\TAL JLiSrICE l'RO/\'TLI"IE 3 -28 (2001); Terence J_ Centner ct al., Environ1ne11tal 
Justice and Toxic Releaoeo: EsiabliJ-hinR Evidence of f)iscri1ninarory L'ffect Based on Race and 
Not Income, 3 \VIS. ENVTL. L.J. l 19, 120 (1996). 
33. See L'rs1c_ supra note 27, at 497; .1ee tliso Jarnes H. Colopy, Note, The Road !Ros 
Tr,,ve/ed: Pur;uing Environmental .fusticP 7hrvugh 7it/,.. VI of the (;ivi/ Righl!i Act of !964, 13 
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Protection Clause as a legal vehicle for addressing environmental 
discrimination. 
II. "ll!E EQCAL PROTECTION CLACSE 
A. Brief Overview of Relevant F:qual Protection JurisJJrudence 
The Fourteenth Amendment specifically empo\'.'ers the federal govern1nent 
to act against discriminatory govern1nent actions at the state and local level, 
particularly tho~e made on the basi~ of race. 34 According to the Equal 
Protection Clause, no state shall "deny to any person within its juri5diction the 
equal protection of the laws.'..is ''['f]he purpose of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth A1nendment is to secure every person within the State's 
juri5diction against intentional and arbitrary di~crimination, whether 
occasioned by express terms of a statute or by its improper execution through 
duly constituted agents.'' 36 The United States Supreme Court ha~ concluded 
that the function of the Equal Protection C:Jause is to ensure that the 
government treats "all persons sin1ilarly situated" the ~ame. 37 
An equal prote\.:tion claim essentially has two elements: (!)the plaintiff 
was treated differently from other similarly situated persons, and (2) this 
different treat1nent was motivated by one of the following: (a) an intent to 
discriminate on the basis of a characteristic, 5uch as race or religion; (b) an 
intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
Constitution: or (c) a bad faith intent to injure a person.38 fn an equ<Jl 
protection case, after the plaintiff shows that a facially neutral statute has a 
disproportionate impact on him, he must prove that the govem1ncnlal decision­
rnaker re~punsible for the act causing the adverse impact was tnotivated by an 
invidious discriminatory purpose.39 
STAN. EKVTL. L.J. 125 (!994); Benford, supra note 19, al 284--289 (advocating the use of Title 
VIII or Che Civil Righrn Ai.:l uf 1968 (Fair Huu5ing Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631, co eomhal 
en~ironn1cntal d1~cnrninat1on). 
34. Comfort ex rel >!c111nyer v. Lynn Sch. Co1nm, 283 f_ Supp. 2d 328, 391 {D. Mass. 
2003). 
35. CS_ COKST. ainend. XIV,§ 1: see also Bluitt v. Iluustun lndep. Sch. Di>t., 236 F. Supp. 
2d 703. 734 (S.D. Tex. 2002). 
36. Vil!. uf V·/illowbruok v. Olcch. 528 C.S. 562, 564 (2000) (4uoting Sioux Cit} Hndgc Co. 
~.Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441, 445 (1923)). 
37. City of Cleburne v Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 C.S. 432, 439 (1985) (stating that 
"[L]he E4ual Protection Clause of the l•ourtccnth Amendment command<, that no State shall 'deny 
ID any person within its juri<,dJCtion the equal protection of the laws,' "'1h1ch is es>ent1ally a 
direction that all persons >uni!arly situated should be 1realed alike."). 
38 See Diesel v Town of l.cwi~boro, 232 F 3d 92. 103 (2d Cir. 2U!Xl) (quoting T.eClair ~. 
Snundcrs, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir. 1980)). 
39. See United States v. J[are, 3081'. Supp. 2d 955, 991 (D. !\ch 2004). 
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The courts have acknowledged intentional discrimination in three contexts. 
First, courts have been willing to find discriminatory intent in those cases 
where a law or policy has expressly categorized citizens on the basis of race.40 
In addition, courts have found discriminatory intent in situations where a 
facially neutral law or policy has been applied differently to citizens because of 
their race.41 Finally, courts have noted that discriminatory intent may exist 
when a facially neutral law or policy, that has been applied evenhandedly, was 
motivated by discriminatory intent and had a racially discriminatory impact.42 
The Supreme Court has structured its equal protection analysis by 
establishing the following three levels of review for challenges to govem1nent­
supported actions: rational basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.43 
"When a legislative enactment has been challenged on equal protection 
grounds, one standard of review is rational basis review, which requires that 
the law be rationally related to a legitimate govern1nent interest."44 ·rhe 
rational basis test is the lowest level of review. Thus, governmental decisions 
analyzed under the rational basi~ test arc a\Jnost always upheld. ·rhe rational 
basis test is applied to cases where the challenged activity did not impact a 
person in a protected class or undenninc a fundarncnta! right.45 
The Supreme Court has al~o developed an intermediate level of ~crutiny 
that lies "lbletv.'een [the] extremes of rational basis review and strict 
scrutiny ...."46 ·rypically, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny when it has 
to review laws that impact quasi-suspect classifications such as gender or 
age.47 When a classification affects "suspect clas~es" of persons or burdens a 
fundamental right, "strict scrutiny" applies and a con1pclling governmental 
interest must be shown to justify the classification.~8Strict scrutiny is such a 
high standard that its application usually results in a victory for the plaintiff. 
The standard is applied whenever a 1ncmber of a suspect class can prove 
discriminatory intent.49 Therefore, in order to have any level of success, 
40. See 1-:Iunt v. Cromartie, 526 US 541, 546 (1999). 

41 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, l 18 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1886). 

42. See Viii. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. l!ous. Dev. Corp., 429 lJ.S. 252, 264 65 (1977). 
43. Goulart v. Meadows. 220 F. Supp. 2d 494. 501 (D. Md. 2002); ;ee al:,·o Darren Lenard 
llutch1nson, '"Unexplaim1b/e on (;round.1 Other Than Race""· The Inversion of Privilege and 
Subordination in Equal Protection Juri.\prudenre, U ILL. L Rrv. 6 l 5, 633--634 (2003). 
44. Ran1os v. rown ofVcnion, 353 F.3d 171, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2003) 
45. Se-e id., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3<l 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 2000). 
46. Clark v. Jeter, 486 L'.S. 456, 461 (1988). 
47. See lJnite<l States v. Coleman, !66 f-.3d 428, 411 (2<l Cir. 1999) (per cunani); see a/;o 
Craig v. Boren, 429 C.S. 190, 197 ( 1976). 
48. United Stales v. Extreme A<;1,oes., lne., 352 F. Supp. 2d 578, 585 (2005). 

49. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). 

!T]hc purpose of strid .1crutiny i.1 to ··snmke out" illegitimate use~ of race hy a.'>.',uring that 

[a 1tate actor] is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly su~pect tool. 

The te~t also ensure> that the means cho>cn "fit'" thi'> compelling goal so closely that there 
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environmental discrimination plaintiffs must prove that deci.'iions to place 
environmental hazards in their communities ~'ere motivated by racial 
considerations. To meet their burden of proof, those plaintiffs must have 
I. . f . ;oaccess to qua tty 1n onnat1on. 
B. Setninal Equal 1~rotection Cases 
Equal Protection litigation is controlled by two seminal Supreme Court 
decision.'>: Washington v. Davis,51 and Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.52 
In Davis, Harley and Sellers, two black men, unsuccessfully applied to 
become police officers in Washington, D.C.53 Their applications were rejected 
becau~e they did not pass a written personnel test.54 Harley and Sellers filed a 
lawsuit alleging that the police department's recruiting procedures, including 
the written personnel test, were racially discriminatory in violation of the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendmcnt.55 Instead of claiming intentional 
discrimination, the plaintiffs contended that the written test bore no 
relationship to job performance and had a discriminatory effect of screening 
out black applicants.56 
The district court n1ade three key conclusions. The first two conclusions 
the court made were that the number of blacks on the police force was not 
proportionate to the racial content of the city and that more blacks flunked the 
test than white applicants:'7 The court also determined that the police 
department did not validate the test to gauge if it was a reliable indicator of job 
performance. 58 Nonethele.'is, the district court refused to find intentional 
discri1nination on the part of the police department and granted the 
department's summary judgment motion.'9 
In reaching its decision, the district court was influenced by the fact that 
(I) 44o/o of the new police recruit.'> were black~, a percentage that was 
proportionate to the number of blacks on the police force and equal to the 
number of 20~ to 29-year-old blacks located in the recruiting area; (2) the 
i'> linlc or no possibility that the motive for the clao·:,ification was 1llcgit1matc racial 
prejudice or stereotype. 
Id. (quoting Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S 469, 493 (1989)) (c1nphasis added). 
50. The value of information will be discu.'>scd in a later section. 

51 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 

52. 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
53. !Javi1, 426 t:.s. at 232-33. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. 




58. Davis, 426 US. at 235 
59. Id. 
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police department had affirmatively recruited blacks and had many pass the 
test, but then fail to report for duty; and (3) the test was a useful indicator of 
training school performance and was not designed to, and did not, discriminate 
against olhcrwise qualified hlacks.60 
In an opinion written by Justice \Vhite, the United States Supreme Court 
affirmed the district court's verdict because it concluded that the written test 
was facially neutral. 61 'fhe Court decided that the disproportionate impact of 
the test on black applicants did not necessitate a finding that the test was a 
purposely discriminatory devicc. 62 In order to justify its decision, the Court 
asserted that a governmental action is not unconstitutional just because it has a 
disparate impact upon the members of a minority group.63 1'he Court reasoned 
that "fd_lisproportionate i1npact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole 
touchstone of an invidious racial discri1nination forbidden by the 
Constitution. "64 
Since Davis, it has been understood that a facially neutral govern1nental 
action may be constitutionally valid even if it disproportionally impacts racial 
1ninorities. However, if the evidence shows that an "invidious discriminatory 
purpose" was a rnotivating factor behind the action, the government has lhe 
burden of proving that the action was taken using racially neutral selection 
criteria and procedures.65 Therefore, in order to prove that the law or 
government action violates the Equal Protection Clause, a person must trace 
the disparate impact to a discriminatory purpose.66 
In light of the /Javis decision, to be successful, environmental 
discrimination plaintiffs must show that the placement of the environmental 
ha/_ard in their community was n101ivatcd by intentional discrimination. A 
person who 5eeks recovery under a theory of purposeful discrimination must 
den1onstrate that the governmental authority implerncnted the facially neutral 
policy being challenged '"because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse 
effects upon an identifiable group."'67 After Davi.1, it was clear that in order to 
bring a successful equal protection case the plaintiff had to prove that the 
governtnent decision-maker was rnotivated by discrin1inatory intent.68 A few 
years later, the United States Supreme Court used a case involving a denial of a 
rezoning request to build low- and moderate-income housing to elaborate upon 
60 fd_ at 235- 36_ 





63. Davis, 246 U.S. at 242. 
64. Id. 
65. Id at 241-42. 
66. John~nn "- Go;crnor ofrla., 353 F.3d 1287, 1310 (I Ith Cir. 2003)_ 
67. Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic As>'n. 288 F.3d 548, 562 (3d Cir_ 2002) {quoting 
Personnel Adm'r of VJ ass. v. Feeney. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979))_ 
68. Davi:i, 426 U.S_ at 239. 
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its Davis decision.69 In an opinion written by Justice Powell, the Court 
concluded that if a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor behind a 
challenged activity, it may be shown by the introduction of circumstantial 
rather than direct evidence.70 
In Village of Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested the 
following relevant factor~ to use as evidcntiary sources: (I) the level of impact 
the governmental deci~ion has on different race~ (v.·bether the action bears 
n1ore heavily on one race than the other);71 (2) the historical background of the 
decision (whether there was a series of governmental actions taken for 
invidious purposes);72 (3) the sequence of events occurring prior to the 
chal!enged action (whether there were departures, ~ubstantive or procedural, 
from the normal deci5ion-making procc~s);73 and (4) the legislative or 
adrninistrative history of the challenged activity (whether a review of the 
contemporary statements made by the decision-makers, the minutes of the 
meetings regarding the challenged decision, or the reports pertaining to the 
challenged decision indicate any type of unfair purpose). 74 In addition to the 
above-mentioned factors, the foreseeability of the adverse consequences may 
have some bearing on the existence of discriminatory intent.75 
If a facially neutral law is administered in a way that reveal~ an 
overwhelming pattern of di~crimination, the pattern of discrimination itself 
may be enough for the court to infer discriminatory intent. This i~ especially 
true in ca~es where a pattern, unexplainable on grounds other than race, 
emerges from the challenged govem1nental action.76 Courts have cmphasi/ed 
that "[e]specially strong statistical proof may be sufficient to draw an inference 
of discriminatory intent . "77 
For example, in .,,ome cases, the governmental entity has engaged in a 
pattern of discrimination so blatant that the Court has found discriminatory 
purpose based solely on the pattern. This proposition is illustrated by the legal 
69. Vil!. of Arlington Heights v . .\1c1ro. llous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252 (1977) 

70_ id_ at 266----07. 

71 id. at 266. 





74. Arlington Heights. 492 US_ at 268. 
75_ See Personnel Adrn'r ufMa~~- v Feeney, 442 U.S 256, 279 n.25 (1979)_ In addrcs>ing 
the foreseeability aspect of discruninatory intent, the Court stated that discriminatory intent 
"1n1plic., more than in1cn1 as vo!it1un ur intent a<; awarenc><; of consequences_ It implic<; that the 
dcci>ion1naker ... selected ur rcaffirn1cd a panicular course uf actiun al least in part 'bccau~e uf.' 
not merely 'in spile of,' 1ls adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279 (cilaliun 
omincd); see ab.o Rachel D. Godsil, Note, Remed}1ng Enviro11mental Racis1n, 90 MICI!. L. REV_ 
394, 409~10 ( [ 991 )_ 
76. See Turner v_ Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 360----61 (1970): seeafao Sirns v_ (icorg1a, 389 U.S. 
404, 407---08 ( 1967)_ 
77. Anderson v. ComeJo, 284 F_ Supp. 2d 1008, 1050 (l\.D Ill. 2003). 
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analysis in Yick Wo v. Hopkins.78 In that case, a city ordinance prohibited 
laundries from operating in wooden buildings without the consent of the city's 
board of supervisors. 79 At that time, there were approximately 320 laundries in 
the city and county of San Francisco; 310 of those laundries were constructed 
of wood.~° Chinese residents owned 240 of the 320 laundries.81 The Chinese 
residents unsuccessfully petitioned the city's board of supervisors for 
permission to continue operating their wooden laundries.82 Nonetheless, all of 
the white residents (except for one woman) who requested permission to 
continue operating their wooden laundries were granted exemptions from the 
ordinance.83 
l"he Court stated: "l"he fact that the right to give consent is reserved in the 
ordinance shows that carrying on the laundry business in wooden buildings is 
not deemed of itself necessarily dangerous."&4 Based upon that observation, 
the Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinance was .~ither to close most 
of the Chinese laundries or to drive the Chinese out of the 2ity and county of 
San Francisco. 85 According to the Court, although the law was facially neutral, 
the public authority applied it with "an evil eye and an unequal hand."86 
'J"hercfore, the Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutional based on the 
city"s discriminatory application of its mandates. 87 
Another case decided on the basis of statistics was (Iomillion v. 
Lightjbot. 88 Gomillion involved an evaluation of the validity of Local Act No. 
140. That law, which \Vas passed by the Alabama Legislature, redefined the 
boundaries of the City of Tuskegee.89 Prior to the passage of the statute, the 
city was square in shape, but as a result of the statute's mandates the shape of 
the city was changed into a strangely irregular twenty~eight-sided figure. 90 
The ultimate impact of the law was to remove all except four or five of the 
black citizens from the city.91 On the contrary, not a single white resident was 
78. 118 U.S. 356 (1886): see a/.10 Da•1d Cnunp, Evidence, Race, Intent, and Evil: The 
Paradox oj Purpose/e;sness 1n the Constitutional Racial Di;crimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. 
RFV. 285, 289-291 (1998). 
79. Yi<'/.:. Wv. 118 U.S. at 358. 





83. Id. at 359. 
84. Yick Wa.118 U.S. at361. 
85. Id at 363. 
86. Id. at 373-74. 
87. Id. at 363 
88. 364 U.S. 339 (!960). 
89. Id. at 340. 
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removed from the city.92 Therefore, the result of the Act was to deprive blacks 
of the benefits of living in the city, including the right to vote in city 
elections.93 
After the passage of the statute, a group of black city residents filed an 
action claiming that the statute was unconstitutional because it violated the 
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of 
the Constitution.94 The district court granted the city's motion for dismissal 
because it concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the matter and the 
complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.95 The 
United States Supreme Court held that the Jaw was probably unconstitutional, 
so the petitioners were entitled to prove their allegations at triai.96 In reaching 
its decision, the Supreme Court reasoned that the act did not appear to be an 
ordinary geographic redistricting measure. Instead, the Supreme Court noted 
that it would be easy to conclude that the law was "tantamount . . . to a 
mathematical demonstration, that the legislation is solely concerned with 
segregating white and colored voters by fencing Negro citizens out of town so 
as to deprive them of their pre-existing municipal vote."97 
Cases like the ones discussed above are rare and have been nonexistent in 
the environmental discrimination context. As a result, the establishment of 
intent as the standard for proving discrimination has placed an onerous burden 
on plaintiffs. In order to be successful, these plaintiffs have to introduce 
evidence showing that the governmental action was clearly motivated by 
discriminatory considerations. A central reason why plaintiffs in 
environmental discrimination cases have been unable to meet their burden of 
proof is the lack of access to quality information. As the results of the 
environmental discrimination cases discussed in the next section indicate, 
infonnation is a vital component of putting forth a successful case. 




The following three cases illustrate how the Equal Protection doctrine has 
been interpreted in cases involving the placement of environmentally 
hazardous facilities in predominately minority communities. In each case, the 
court rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection claim, citing an absence of clear 
evidence of discriminatory intent on the pare of the decision-maker. Even 
though the evidence of disparate impact was clear and acknowledged by some 
92. id. 
93. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. 
94. Id. at 340. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 347-48_ 
97. Id. at 341. 
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of rhe couns, rhe courts' adherence to the intent requirement prevented the 
plaintiffs from prevailing. 98 In each case, the plaintiffs' inability to prove 
purposeful and conscious intent to discriminate on the part of the decision­
makcr prevented them from winning their Equal Protection challenge. 
A. 	 Bean v. Southivestem Waste Management Corp. 99 
In Bean, the plaintiffs sued to contest the Texas Department of Health's 
decision to grant a permit to Southwestern Waste Management to place a solid 
waste facility in the East Houston-Dyersda\c Road area in Hani~ County. 100 
The plaintiffs claimed that the decision was motivated by racial discrimination 
because the city had a history of placing solid wa~te sites in black 
neighborhoods. 101 
·rhe plaintiffs relied upon statistical data to show a pattern of racial 
discrimination in the state agency's placement of solid waste sites in minority 
communities. 102 The first set of data supplied by the plaintiffs dealt with the 
two solid wastes sites that the City of Houston planned to use. 103 The plaintiffs 
contended that the selection of those two sites was discriminatory because the 
area contained lOOo/o of the type-one landfills used by the City of Houston, and 
only 6.9% of the entire population of the city. 104 The Court found that 
argument unpersuasive for two reasons. First, the Court reasoned that, because 
only two sites were involved. the data was statistically insignificant. HIS 
Second, the Court determined that, of the two proposed sites, one was in a 
primarily white censu~ tract and the other was in a primarily minority census 
tract. 106 Therefore, race was probably not a consideration when the city chose 
the two sites. 107 
The second set of data the plaintiff~ submitted focused on the total number 
of solid waste ),ites located in the proposed target area. 108 The plaintiffs noted 
that the t<irget area contained 15o/o of the city's solid waste sites, but only 6.9o/o 
of its population. 109 The plaintiffs argued that most of the solid waste sites 
98. See Hrian 1-'acrstcin, Co1n1ncnt, Resurrrrling t.'qual Protecrion Cha/lenge.1 to 
Fnvirunmental Inequity: A f)e/ibera/p/y Indifferent Opt1m1stic Approach, 7 lL PA. J_ CONS! L 
561, 566---569 (2004) (discu.,~ing ca.,es where the plaintiffs attempted tu u>e the Equal Protection 
Clau>e to challenge in<lu..,Lrial ....iling <lec1s1ons). 
99. 	 482 F. Supp. 673 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
100. Id. at fi74 75. 

IOI. Id. at 675. 

102. 	 Id. at 678. 
103. Id. 

Hl4. lirun. 482 F. Slipp. at 678. 

105. 	 Id. 
106. 	 Id. 
107. 	 Id. 
108. 	 Id. 
109. 	 Beun, 482 F Sllpp. at 678. 
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were placed in that area because it had a 70% minority population. 110 The 
court decided that the placement of so many solid waste sites in the target area 
had nothing to do with race because it was reasonable to place the sites in an 
area that was sparsely populated. 111 In addition, the court concluded that race 
was not a factor in the placement of the sites because half of the sites in the 
target area were in census tracts with more than a 70o/o white population. 112 
The third set of data put forth by the plaintiffs considered the city as a 
whole. The data showed that only 32.4% of the sites were located in the 
western half of the city where 73.4% of the whites lived. 113 In addition, 
according to the data, 67 .6% of the sites were located in the eastern half of the 
city where 61.6% of the minority population resided. 114 The court disagreed 
with the plaintiffs' interpretation of the data. After analyzing the data relying 
on census tracts instead of halves or quadrants of the city, the court stated that 
"[t]he difference between the racial composition of census tracts in general and 
the racial composition of census tracts with solid waste sites is ... only 
0.3%."115 The court found that small difference to be statistically 
. . .fi '" 1ns1gn1 1cant. 
After evaluating all of the statistical evidence, the court rejected the 
plaintiff's argument and held that, although the siting decision appeared to be 
"unfortunate and insensitive" the plaintiffs had not proven that the state 
officials had a discriminatory intent. 117 The court pointed out several 
weaknesses in the plaintiffs' evidence. Regarding the statistical data, the court 
indicated that neighborhood data, as opposed to census tract data, would have 
been more forceful if the plaintiffs had shown that sites located in 
predominately white census tracts were in minority neighborhoods. 118 
Moreover, the court found that the non-statistical data was inadequate to show 
discriminatory intent. 119 The court stated that, in its opinion, there were too 
many unanswered questions, including how sites were selected and what 





114. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 678. 
115. Id. at 679. 
116. Id. 
! 17. id. at 680. 
118. Id. 
119. Bean, 482 F. Supp. at 679-80. 
120. Id. at 680. 
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B. 	 East Bibb Twiggs 1VeighborhoodAss'n v. lltfacon-Bibb County Planning & 
Zoning Commission 121 
The minority plaintiffs in East Bibb sought to reverse a decision by the 
local planning board to locate a landfill in a predominately black 
community. 122 In the case, Mullis Tree Service, Inc. and Robert Mullis applied 
to the Commission for a conditional use permit to operate a non-putrescible 
waste landfill in a census tract containing 5,527 people. 123 Of these residents, 
3,367 were black and 2,149 were white. 124 The Commission initially voted to 
deny the application. 125 However, after rehearing the matter, the Commission 
approved the final site plan for the landfill and issued a conditional use permit 
to Mullis. 126 
Analyzing the pennit decision, the court applied the Arlington Heights 
five-part test to detennine whether the plaintiffs' evidence supported a finding 
of discriminatory intent. 127 After reviewing all of the evidence, the court 
concluded that the Commission's decision to approve the conditional use 
permit was not motivated by the intent to discriminate against blacks. 128 The 
court noted that, since the census tract contained a majority black population, 
the decision to approve the placement of the landfill in that area had a greater 
impact on blacks than it did on whites. 129 Therefore, the court conceded that 
there was glaring evidence of disparate impact. 130 Nevertheless, according to 
the court, there were "no specific antecedent events which support a 
determination that race was a motivating factor in the Commission's 
decision."131 In making that determination, the court emphasized that the only 
other Commission-approved landfill was located in a predominately white 
132
census tract. 
The court's opinion did offer environmental discrimination plaintiffs some 
guidance. The trial judge noted that the local Commission could not "actively 
solicit this or any other landfill application," 133 and the opinion hinted that 
sudden changes in zoning or relaxations in procedure would be considered 
121. 	 706 F. Supp. 880 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
122. 	 Id. at 881. 
123. 	 Id. 
124. 	 Id. 
125. 	 Id. at 882. 
126. 	 Easr Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 883. 
127. 	 Id. at 884. 
128. 	 Id 
129. 	 Id. 
130. Id. 

13 !. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886. 

132. 	 Id. at 884. 
133. 	 Id. at 885. 
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highly suspect. 134 The court determined that evidence of past discriminatory 
decisions by agencies other than the county planning commission wa5 
irrelevant to the discrimination issue it was eonsidering. 135 Therefore, courts 
may refuse to consider the general state or city history of racism and 
segregation. However, the court did not rule out the possibility of considering 
past decisions by the Commission that had resulted in a disparate impact on the 
. . . ll~
m1nor1ty community. · 
c. R.LS.E., Inc. v. Kay 137 
In R.l.S.t."., a hi-racial citizen group challenged the decision or the local 
county hoard to site a landfill in a predominately black comrnunity in 
Virginia. 138 Since the landfills in King and Queen County did not meet the 
~tate'~ new environmental standards, the Board of Supervisors negotiated with 
the Chesapeake Corporation for a joint venture landfill. 1-14 During the summer 
of 1988. after (:hesapeake abandoned the negotiations, the board decided to 
purchase property from Chesapeake to use as a landfill site. 14° Chesapeake 
offered the board the choice of buying either the Piedmont Tract or the 
Nonnan-Saunders Tract. 141 The board ~elected the Piedmont Tract because 
tests showed that it was suitable for use as a landfill. 142 After several public 
hearings, n1embers of the Board unanimously voted to buy the Piedmont Tract 
for use as a i<mdfill. 143 
1'he me1nbers of the conununity where the proposed landfill was to be 
located opposed the project. 144 l'o hear the concerns of the residents, 5everal 
board me1nhers attended a meeting organized by Reverend Taylor, pastor of 
Second Mt. ()Jive Baptist C:hurch. 1 ~ 5 The persons ohjecting to the project were 
worried that if the landfill \Vas placed in their neighborhood ( l) their quality of 
life would he diminished; (2) their property values would he lowered; (3) their 
worship and 5ocial functions at Second Mt. ()Jive Bapti~t Church would be 
disrupted; (4) the grave sites on the church ground~ would be damaged; (5) 
134. Iri. at 886. 
135. Id. al 885. 
136. East IJ1bb, 706 f'. Supp. at 885. 




139 Iri. al 1146. 

140 Id. al 1147. 

141 id. al 1146. 
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local access road~ would have to be improved; and (6) the historic church 14r' 
and community would be harmed. 147 
In light of the fact that the three other landfills in the area were all in 
neighborhoods that were at least ninety-five percent black and that the county 
had previously refused to ,.itc a landfill in u predominately white 
neighborhood, the court acknowledged that the landf11l had a disproportionate 
impact upon the black community. 14~ Nonetheless, the court concluded that 
the plaintiffs had not satisfied the remainder of the discriminatory purpo~e 
equation and rejected the Equal Protection claim. 149 
The court was influenced by the board's need to decide quickly on a 
location for the landfill. 150 The board's prior atte1npt to buy landfill space had 
been unsuccessful. 151 Because the Piedmont Tract had been found 
environmental!y suitable for the purpose of the landfill development. instead of 
looking at other possible locations, the board took immediate 5teps to acquire 
the property. 152 Moreover, the court seemed to give some weight to the fact 
that the board 1naking the siting decision contained three white men1bers and 
two black members. 153 further, the court appeared to suspect R.I.S.E:s 
motives in bringing a discrimination action to challenge the siting deci~ion. 
The court stated that "[r]ace discrimination did not become a significant public 
issue until it appeared that the initial thrust was failing." 154 ·rhe court's 
~kepticism was probably based upon the fact that R.I.S.E. reco1n1nended a 
replacement site that was located in a predominately black area. 155 
D. Cornponents ofa Successful Environ1nental [Jiscrimination Case 
The intent requirement has been a major stumbling block for 
environmental discrimination plaintiffs seeking relief under the Equal 
Protection Clausc. 156 Nonetheless, the courts have acknowledged that if the 
plaintiffs present the correct type of circumstantial evidence, they can prevail 
using the Equal Protection Clause. The courts have given no indication that 
they will substitute the intent requirement for a lesser standard. 157 In order to 
146. In 1869. freed '>laves hu1lt the Second \1t. Olive Baptist Church. Id. 
147. R.l.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at l 147. 
148. fd. at 1148--49. 
149. /d.atll49. 
150. Id. at 1150. 
151. Id. 
152. R.l.S.f;, 768 F. Supp. at 1150. 
153. s,,,, id at 1146. 

l:'i4. Id.al 1148. 

155. Id. 
156. See Richan! J. Lazarus. Pur.~umg "f."nvlfonmPnta! Justice": The Di>trihutiona/ t.ffecrs of 
Environmental Protec1ion, 	87 Nw. lJ. L Ri0 v 787, 829-33 (1993). 
157 Cox v. City of Jackson. 343 F. Supp. 2d 546, 570 (S.D. M1o;s. 2004). 
489 2006] C/IANG/1\IG THE BATHWATER AND KFFP!h'G THF RABY 
meet lhe burden of proof, under the currcnl sy~tem, plainli!Ts must have acces5 
to information. l"herefore, persons fighling environmental discrimination 
should take sleps to gather the information necessary to prove discriminatory 
intent. 
In light of the ca~e precedenl, thi~ section is an attempt to de1nonstrate the 
important role that information plays in preparing a successful equal protection 
action in the environmental discrimination context. The starting point in 
preparing an Equal Protection case is still the Arlington Heights factors. 158 
·rherefore, the focus of the discus~ion is upon the criteria established by that 
case. A multi-factor approach similar to the one adopted here has been taken 
by others. 1'w 'fhe factors dealing with events leading up to the decision and the 
legislative and administrative history of the decisions are combined. 
I. Disparate Impact 
The first thing an environmental discrimination plaintiff needs to establish 
is the existence of racially disparate impact. 160 In order to be successful, it is 
important for the plaintiff to have good statistical data. According to Bradford 
Mank, the selection of the population sample for comparison impacts the 
disparate impact analysis. Mank further asserts that, in order to prove 
disparate impact, the plaintiff must compare the demographics of those in the 
adversely affected area with others in the area who are not impacted by the 
decision. 161 The effort and expense involved in gathering data often leads 
plaintiffs to conduct their analyses using "pre-ordained units of [population] 
cornparison, such as census tracts or zip codes." 162 Census data is often used 
because it is readily available in paper and computerized fonns. 16:1 The EPA 
suggests the use of census data to classify the population in the affected area 
with regards to race, ethnicity, economic, and educational demographics. 1M 
However, the agency cautions that census data may not be accurate in so1ne 
158. Viii. of Arlington Heights v. 'Vletro_ Hous Dev_ Corp, 429 US_ 252. 266----68 (1977). 
159. See e.g., 1\licc Ka,wan, L"nvrronmental Ww: Grist For The Equal Protection 1\1il/, 70 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 387, 411-426 (1999).). 
160. Ea>t Bibb Twigg> Neighborhrxxl Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Y,oning 
Comm'n, 706 F_ Supp 880, 884 (M [)_Ga_ 1989)_ 
161 Bradford C_ Mank, Proving an E11vironme111al Ju11ice Case: Veten11ini11g an 
Appropriate Cornparifon Popularion, 20 VA. EKVTL. L.J. 365, 383 (200 l ). 
162 Id. al 410, oee afao EPA GL"IDA'.'ICE, supra note 9, at§ 2_1_2 (stating that data obtained 
from the cen~us is one of Che n1ost conunon types of inforrnation used to deterrnine the minority 
status of a connnunity)_ 
163. The EPA opine' that the availahihty of census demographic information in digiti7ed 
forn1at can he helpful when analyzing environmental JU>lice issue>. EPA GL"IDANCE, IHlpra note 
9.at§5.1 
164 Id_ 
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cases 
16
·' One possible cause of this deficiency 1s the fact that census data is 
the result of self-reporting. 166 
In most instances, such as in the Rean case, this type of analysis presents 
problcms. 167 In that case, the court reasoned that the plaintiffs' case might 
have been stronger if they had submitted neighborhood data as opposed to 
census tract data. 168 The census tract data presented did not provide a true 
picture of the conununity affected by the proposed landfill. Jn justifying its 
decision not to find a discriminatory purpose, the court noted that the county's 
other landfill was located in a predominately white census tracl. 169 
In order to obtain better information to submil to the court about the 
compo~ition of the community, the plaintiffs should use olhcr methods. For 
instance, they rnay be able to get information from local resources by asking 
questions, conducting interviews, and doing research. 170 Additionally, the 
plaintiffs can use a geographic information system (GIS) 171 or a similar 
mapping system to identify the location and percentage of the minority persons 
in the comn1unity. 172 ·rhe EPA has acknowledged that maps, aerial 
photographs, and GIS can be used to discover geographic areas where possible 
. I . . h . 113
envtronmenta JUStJce concerns su s1st. 
It appears that the plaintiffs will have a better claim if they are able to 
show, for example, that the area i1nmediately surrounding the proposed facility 
is composed alniost exclusively of minority residents and that the population 
heco1nes whiter as the distance fron1 the facility increa<;es. Hence, in order to 
obtain the most useful data, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should use 
an analytic method that analyzes demographic~ in terms of proximity to the 
proposed hafard. 174 
The effects of an environmental hazard frequently occur in inverse 
proportion to the distance from the location or site of the hazard. 175 For 
165. See 1d. at§ 2.l.2. "[!]! 1nay be nece~sary for the EPA NEPA analyst to validate !census] 
infonnation with the llSC of additional sources." fd. ··The additional methods include 
contacting 101.:al resources, govcrnn1enl agencies, conuncrcial database firms, and the use of 
locat1onal/d1stributional tool5" Id. 
Hi6. Id. at§ 5.1 
167. Bean v. Sw. Waste Mgmt. Corp. 482 F. Supp. 673, 677 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 678. 

l 70. See generally EPA GLIDANCE, Jupra nolc 9, at§§ 2.1.2, 5.1. 

171. GIS systcn1s are geographic references or co1nputcrized atlases. See id. at § 5. I. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. 
174. See Richard D. Gragg, III ct al., The Location and Co1nmunity Denwgraphics af 
Targe1ed Enwronmen1a/ HazardvuJ· Sites in Floridt1, 12 J. LAJ\'D USE & ENVTl.. L. I, 12-14 
( 1996) (describing a study conducted in fifteen Florida counties). 
175. See Juha B. Latham Worshain, Disparate !1npact l .uw:n1i1J· Uruler "fitle VI, Section 602: 
Con a l.ega/ Taul Build l~nv1ronmen/11l .!u.\lice 1, 27 B.C. ENVTL. Aff. L. REV. 631, 649 (2000) 
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example, the closer the minority population is to the ha.lard, the greater the 
likelihood that those persons will be advcr5ely impacted. Thus, proximity to 
the environmental hazard usually correlates with the probability that the 
minority population will be disproportionately affected by the location of the 
hazard. 176 As a consequence, if environmental discrimination advocates can 
show that minority persons in the community live nearest to the environmental 
hazard, they may have a better chance of proving disparate impact. 
Commentators have suggested the use of "maps, aerial photographs, and 
information databases" in order to identify the communities that are within 
close proximity of the proposed project. 177 
2. Historical Background 
In Arlington Heights, the Supreme Court suggested that courts look to the 
role of historical discrimination tu determine discriminatory intent. 178 The 
court in £ast Bibb, however, stated that it would only consider relevant 
discrimination perpetrated by the particular government agency that made the 
decision being challenged by the plaintiffs. 179 In the context of ha.£ardous 
waste sitings, the agencies are usually newly created, so they may have no 
history of discrimination. 1·hereforc, environrncntal discrimination plaintiffs 
will be at a ~ubstantial disadvantage when trying to gather the information 
necessary to prove discriminatory intent. 
Furthermore, it appears that the courfs focus may be even narrower than 
the action~ of the agency involved in the case. For in5tance, in R.l.S.E., while 
analyzing the past siting decisions of the board, the court pointed out which 
present board members had been involved in 1naking those decisions. 180 
Consequently, il is possible that the plaintiffs could prove di~criminatory intent 
in past siting decisions by the agency at issue, and still fail, if the current 
mernbers were not a part of the agency at the time those siting decisions were 
made. 
(citing EPA, IKTERIM GL'lDANCI·. !·OR INVl'-~TIGATING TITLE VI AD\.llNISTRATlVE COMl'LAI'>J IS 
CHALl.E:-IGl;>;G PERMITS (1998), and ~taring lhal the identity of the population affected is 
"generally detennined by proximity to the fac1hty"). 
176. Graggetal.,;upranute 174,at 16-17. 
177. Cheryl A. Calloway & Karen L. 1--'crguson, The '"lfurnan Environment" Requirement of 
the National 1,·n,ironnienta/ Pu/l(:yArt: lmp/1ca1ionsfor Environmenral JusrJce, 1997 DErROJTC. 
I.. \1JCH. ST. L. REV. 1147, 1165 (1997); see a/;-u EPA GUIDANCE. J"upra note 9, at§ 5.1. Local 
maps and aerial photographs may give a "snap shot," or big picture of where low-income and 
minority per~on-. are located in the area and their proximity to the proposed project. Id. They 
may aho be used lo identify important natural resources that n1ay be affected hy the proposed 
project. Id. 
178. Vil!. of Arlington Heights v. Metro Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252, 267-68 (1976). 
179. East Hibb Twiggs Ncighhorhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Con1m'n, 706 F Supp. 880, 885 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
180. R.1.S.E., Inc. v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1148 (E.D. Va. 1991) 
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One potential solution to the problem is for the plaintiffs to have 
background checks conducted on the individual agency members to determine 
their attitudes toward racial minorities. This information may also he gained 
by searching old newspapers. 181 Another potential source of this type of 
information is minutes from agency meetings or pubic hearings. If the 
plaintiffs arc able to discover insensitive remarks the members have made in 
their public and/or private capacity, they may be ahlc to convince the court that 
the rcrnarks are relevant to show that racial discrimination affected the 
agency's decision-making process. In addition, the plaintiffs n1ay strengthen 
their case if they can show that an agency n1en1bcr's past behavior indicates 
that he or ~he has a tendency to disregard the concern~ of the minority 
community (e.g., a~sociating with a business venture that exploits minorities). 
The racial composition of the dccision-rnaking body may also come into 
play under this factor. This seemed to carry some weight in R.l.S.J::. Jn that 
case, when finding no discriminatory purpose, the court emphasized that the 
board making the decision contained two black mcmbers. 182 The court's 
reliance on that fact to support its finding of no discriminatory purpose is 
flawed for two reasons. First, the court did not consider the fact that the black 
1nembers on the board were out-numbered three to two. 18 _i Thus, even if both 
black members had voted against the siting decision. the permit probably 
would have still been approved. Second, the court's reasoning presupposes 
that blacks are not capable of intentionally discriminating against other blacks. 
It is entirely possible for an all rninority deci~ion-making body to intentionally 
discriminate against a predominantly minority community. 184 In addition, the 
court noted that the two black members were elected to the board in a special 
election, afler the federal government ordered a redistricting. 185 The fact that 
the election was ordered should have indicated to the court that some type of 
racial ten~ion might have exi~ted in the county. 
181. See Fu.1·t Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 885. The court was w1lhng 10 read newspaper article<; to 
gel historical background on dcci51on-makcrs. 	 Id. 
!82 R.!.S.E., 768 F. Supp. at l 146 (noting the racial composition of the hoard). 
183. See id. 
184. See Castaneda v. Partida. 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice 
/\1arshall slated· 
Social scientists agree that mcn1bers of nunonty groups frequently respond to 
discri1nination and prejudice hy at1c1npting to d1sa.'>sociate them.'>clvcs from the group. 
even to the point of adopting the 1najority's negative altitude~ to\vards the minority. Such 
behavior occur~ with p:ut1cular frequency an1ong rnembcr<, of n1inonty group.'> who have 
achieved son1e 1ne;isure of econorn1c or political succeo~ and thereby have gained sorne 
acceptability arnong the do1ninanl group. 
Id. 
185. R.l.S.E., 768 f<. Supp. at 1146. 
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3. Departures from Procedure 
The East Bibb plaintiffs argued that the Commission had deviated from its 
normal procedures in several ways: the Commission urged participation from 
the city and county, it granted a rehearing after the petition for a landfill was 
denied, and it made certain findings of fact. 186 The court acknowledged that 
the Comntission had departed somewhat from the norm, but did not identify 
any procedural flaws. 187 However, the court did analyze the reasons behind 
the procedural changes and indicated that sudden changes in procedure would 
be given a hard look. 188 
Therefore, environmental discrimination plaintiffs should gather 
information to familiarize themselves with the agency's decision-making 
procedures by attending meetings dealing with the placement of environmental 
hazards, reading the agency's regulations or bylaws, and looking through 
minutes of agency meetings. To support their assertions, the plaintiffs need to 
present evidence that the decision-making body deviated from its normal 
practices when it decided to approve the placement of an environmental hazard 
in their community. This will shift the burden to the agency to justify its 
actions. Moreover, if the agency has no independent siting criteria, the 
plaintiff should point that out to the court. The lack of objective criteria for 
making placement decisions may indicate that the decision-makers were 
subjective in the selection process. As a result, the courts may be more willing 
to find discriminatory intent. 
4. Events Prior to the Decision 
The court may be willing to infer discriminatory intent from relevant 
actions that occurred before the agency decided to place the environmental 
hazard in a minority neighborhood. For example, in Bean, the court stated that 
it would have been helpful to know the initial reason the chosen site was 
selected for consideration. 189 In addition, the East Bibb court opined that it 
would not be proper for the decision-making agency to actively solicit an 
application to place a site in a certain neighborhood. 190 Hence, the 
environmental discrimination plaintiff should do discovery as soon as possible 
to try to find information about the selection process. 191 If plaintiffs are able to 
prove that the selection of the minority neighborhood was anything but 
186. East Bibb, 706 F. Supp. at 886. 
187. Id. 
188. See id. 
189. Bean v. Sw. Wa<;te Mgmt. Corp, 482 F. Supp. 673, 680 (S.D. Tex. 1979). 
190. East Bibb, 706 F_ Supp. at 885. 
191. See Bean, 482 F_ Supp. at 680 (noting that extensive discovery was not conducted in chis 
case). 
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random, the court may be more willing to question the motives of the decision­
makcrs. 
The plaintiff should also try to show that at the time the site was 
considered the agency members knew that the disparate impact would occur 
because they were aware that the affected community \Vas already substantially 
burdened by environmental hazards. It must be noted, however, that in 
response to that argument, the court in Bean stated that a sample of two ~ites 
wa~ not a sufficient database to create a statistically significant result. 192 To 
avoid thut problem, the plaintiffs should focus on other types of environmental 
hazards in addition to the type at issue. For instance, the affected 
neighborhood may already have major highways running through it, an airport 
nearby, and several industrial plants located within it. Recognizing that the 
agency knew that the affected neighhorhood already contained these hazards 
before it made its siting decision n1ay 1nake the court view the decision more 
critically. 
Another factor that the court considered relevant in t,-a.1t Bihh was the fact 
that the county had previously refused to site the landfill at the approved site, 
and it had apparently not considered siting the landfill in a predominately 
white neighborhood. 1Y3 Consequently, the plaintiffs n1ay have a strong case for 
discriminatory intent if they are able to show that the siting agency did not 
consider any suitable predorninately white neighborhoods as a potential 
location for the environmental hazard. 
5. Other Considerations 
·rhe for1nula for proving intent in an environrnental discrimination case 
conies down to the plaintiffs obtaining good infor1nation, including statistical 
and scientific data, by conducting thorough discovery and utilizing other 
investigative techniques. The need for presenting good statistical data has 
been addressed in the previous section. Thus, the focus of this section is on the 
need for good science. 
Good scientific testing will enable the plaintiffs to determine if the 
proposed site is environmentally suitable for the proposed use. It will also 
allow the plaintiffs to discover if there arc other locations in non-minority 
neighborhoods that could accommodate the proposed project. Additionally, 
the plaintiffs will take a big step toward proving a discriminatory purpose if 
they find a site in the area that is alrnost identical, but for racial composition, to 
the one selected. Having the scientific expertise will assist the plaintiffs in 
suggesting alternative sites. If the plaintiffs in R.I.S.E. had availed themselves 
of scientific technology, they nlight have been able to convince the board to 
locate the site in another suitable location. The alternative sites recommended 
192. Id. 
193. 706 F_ Supp at 884-85. 
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by the plaintiffs in R.l.S.E:. were determined to be "environmentally unsuitable 
because of the slope of the land and the existence of a stream running through 
its center." 194 
In the environmental discrin1ination area, the courts have made it clear that 
the placement of an environmental hazard in a minority co1nmunity \vould be a 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the plaintiffs showed a disparate 
impact and proved that the placernent decision was made with a discriminatory 
intent. Thus, the earlier the plaintiffs get involved in the siting process the 
better chance they will have to cornpile the significant amount of information 
necessary to use as circumstantial evidence to build a winning Equal Protection 
case. 
IV. l'Hf". DEHATE OVER Tl-!E VALIDITY OF THE INTENT REQl,lREMhNT 
After showing a disparate impact, in order to convince the court to apply 
strict scrutiny 195 to a govcmrnental action, the plaintiff has to prove that the 
action wa~ motivated by a desire to discri1nin<1te against the plaintiff because 
of his race. 196 In the environmental discrimination context, this 1nean5 that the 
plaintiff ha~ to prove that the governmental actor decided to allow the 
environn1cntal hazard to be located in the plaintiff~s community because of the 
race of the residents. Once the plaintiff meets his or her hurden of proof, the 
hurden shifts to the governmental actor to justify the government's decision. 197 
l'he first ~tep the governmental actor must take to survive strict 5crutiny is to 
"articulate a legislative goal that is properly con~idered a compelling 
govem1nent interest. · " 198 Then, th hat t he tl . . .e govcm1nent must~how t cc1~1on Jt 
made or action it took was narrowly drawn to achieve that compelling 
I . 199governmcnta interest. 
Proponents have continued to ernhracc the justifications that the 
Washington v. Davis Court used when advancing the discriminatory intent 
194. R.l.S.E., Inc., v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. l 144, 1J48{E.D. Ya. 1991). 
195_ "To >urvivc 'otricl scrutiny. an ordinance n1u-;t be justified by compelling governmental 
intcrc-.ts and e1nploy the least rcstricnvc means to effectuate those intere>ts" De1dil v City of 
Milv:aukee, 176 F Supp. 2d 859, 864 (E.D. Wis. 2001). 
196. Johnson v. Ca!iforma, 336 F.3d J 117. l l \7-18 (9lh Cir. 2003). 
197. See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v_ .\1inncsota Dcp'L of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 
2003): John>on v . .\1ortbam. 915 F. Supp. 1574, 1576 (\LD. Fla. 1996). 
198_ Sherbrooke Turf 345 FJd at 969 (8tb Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Harre, 313 I·_ 
Supp. 2d 1086, 1090 (D. Colo. 2004). rev"d, 324 f. Supp 2d 1171 (2004). ''Tbe question i> not 
whether lhc govcrn1nent ha<; a compelling interest in generally enacting the la"" The inquiry 
under e4ual protection is whether there is a con1pelling interest for the clo.ssijicut1on created by 
the law." Barre, 313 r_ Supp 2d at 1090. 
!9\l. MorthuJn, 915 f. Supp. at 1576; ;ee "/so Florida A.G.C_ Council, Inc. v. Florida, 303 r_ 
Supp. 2d 1307, 1314 (N.D. Fla. 2004). 
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20u A d" h J . . h D . I .rcqu1rerncnt. ccor ing to t e ustlces 1n t e av1s case, one exp anation 
for requiring equal protection plaintiffs to prove di~cri1ninatory intent is the 
need fur judicial cconumy. 201 The Court opined that, if the plaintiffs only had 
to prove disproportionate impact, the level of govcrn1nenta! action that would 
be subject to strict judicial scrutiny would incrcase.202 As a consequence, 
legitimate legislative decision-making would be adversely impacted and the 
validity of governmental actions, including tax, welfare, public service, 
regulatory, and licensing statutes would be in doubt.203 
In his article, Professor Charles R. Lawrence III puts forth several other 
possible justifications for the Davis intent requirement. 204 One justification 
Professor Lawrence states in his article can be characterized as judicial 
fairness. He states that the Court determined that it would be unfair for the 
judiciary co 1n1pose penalties on innocent persons in order to ren1edy harrns 
that they did not intentionally cause. 205 In addition, Professor Lawrence 
contends that the Davis Justices' adoption of the discriminatory intent 
requirement rnay be defended on the basis of judicial consistency. 206 Making 
the standard disproportionate impact, as oppo~ed to discriminatory intent, 
would be inconsisten1 with traditional equal protection values because, in order 
to resolve the issue, the judicial decision-maker would have to focus upon the 
race of the plainciffs. 207 Finally, Lawrence seems to indicate that the Davis 
Justices' decision to require discrirninatory intent may be explained on the 
basis of judicial responsibi!ity.208 It rnay be argued that it would be improper 
for the courts to adver5ely impact legitimate social interests in an attempt to 
remedy the racially disproportionate impact of facially neutral govemn1ent 
actions. 209 
1'he persons who disagree with the discriminatory intent requirement have 
consistently stated several 1nain reasons for their opposition. One reason put 
forth by those persons is that the discriminatory intent requirement places an 
arduous and unfair burden of proof on the plaintiff. 210 ·rhe time and expense 
200. Chari<:~ R. Lav..rence III, The Id, the Er:;o, and t:qual Protection: Reckoning with 
UncOn.\Tious Roehm, 39 STA'.'/_ L RFV. 317, 320 (1987). 
201 See id_ at 383. 
202. Washington v. Davis, 426 LLS. 229, 242 (1976) 
203. id_ al 248 (citing Frankl. Good111an, J)e Facto School Segregation. A Constitutional and 
£01pirical Ana/yJis, 60 CALL. REV. 275, 300 (1972))_ 






208. Id. at 320---21. 
209. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 320- 21 
210. See Mw,a Keenheel, The Need for !\'ew legislanon and Lihera/izat1or1 of Current Law.> 
to Combat Env1ronmenl'1/ Racism, 20 TE\.lP. ENYTL L. & TECH. J. 105, 119 (2001) (~tat1ng thci.t 
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nece~sary to determine the motive of a governmental actor can be prohibitive, 
especially since prospective plaintiffs are frequently low-income people and 
minorities who often do not have the money to hire an attorney or expert 
witnesses.211 As a consequence, very few plaintiffs are able to get the courts to 
recognize and resolve incidents of racial di~crimination. 212 
'fhere are also practical things that make it difficult for plaintiffs to obtain 
the information necessary to prove that the governmental actor has acted with a 
discriminatory purpose. For example. the task of discovering the intent of the 
governmental actor will be easier if there is a detailed record of the steps the 
governmental actor took to reach the challenged deci~ion. The decision to 
permit the placement of environmental hazards is usually 1nade at the local 
level, and local governmental agencies often do not maintain detailed 
records.2n Therefore, there is not usually a "smoking gun" for the 
environmental discrimination plaintiff to find. 214 
Opponents also allege that the discri1ninatory intent constraint ignores 
three important realities. First, since a person can unconsciously be 1notivated 
by racism, the governmental actor may not be aware that his deci~ion 1s based 
upon racist beliefs.215 Specifically, Professor Lawrence argues that 
[tjraditional notions of intent do not reflect the fact that decisions about racial 
rnatter~ arc influenced in large part by factors that can be characterized as 
neither intentional-in the sense that certain outcon1cs arc ~elf-con,ciously 
sought~nor unintentional- -in the sen'c that the outcomes are rando1n, 
fortuitous, and uninfluenced by the dcci~ionrnakcr's beliefs, desires, and 
wishc~.216 
"proving discrir111natory intent has been the albatross around the necks of rninonty plaintiffs 
seeking relief from instances of environmental racism"). 
211. Robert Nelson, To Infer or Not to Infer a Discriminalory P1<rpoo·e. Rethinking Equal 
Protection Doctrine, 61 N.Y.U. l.. REV. 334, 344 (1986): M'e also (iod<,il, iupra note 75, al 410: 
Le . ,hc Ann Colcrnan, lt"s the Thought Thilt Co1<n1f: The Intent Req1<iretr1en1 in Environmental 
Racism C/aimr. 25 ST MARY'~ L. J. 447. 473-74 (1993). 
212. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 324; see al!,o Donna Gareis-Srnith, Environmental Raci.fm. 
The Failure of F.qual Protection lo Provide a Judicial Remedy and the Patential of Title VI of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act, 13 TE\.fP. 1-.J\VIL. L & l"!·CH.J. 57, 67 (1994). 
213. Edward Patrick Hoyle, Note, ft"s ,Vot Easy Bem' Green The P.rycho/ogy of Racism, 
Environmental Dr.ll·nm1r1atiun, and !he Argiunent for J1odern1~1ng Equul Protection AnalyJ"il", 46 
VAND. L. RloV. 937, 964-65 (1993). 
2!4 /d.m965 
215. See Ian F. Haney Lope?, fn,-titutionlll Raci:im. Judicial Conduct and a f\'cw Theory of 
Racial Discrimination, I 09 YALI' L.J 1717, ! 806 (2000); .1ee also Linda Hainilton Krieger. The 
Content of Our Categoriei. A Cogr1111ve Rirl.\ Approach to D1scrimint.1t1on and Equal lcn1ploy1nen1 
Opportunity, 47 S"lAJ\. L REV. 1!61,1186 (1995). 
216. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322; see also Miriarn Knn, Note and Coinmcnt, 
Di1crim1nat1on in the Wen Ho Lee Case. Rein1erpre11ng the Intent Requirernent in Conllit1<tion"l 
and Statutory Rt.ice Discrimination Cases, 9 A~IA'\ L.J. 117, 139 (2002). 
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Secondly, since most govemmentai decisions are rnade by a group and not 
by individuals, the governmental action results from the interaction of multiple 
motives. 217 Thus, it is a!Jnost i1npossihle to attribute di~criminatory intent to a 
group of people.218 As a result, each individual decision-maker will be able to 
argue that his action was based upon racially neutral considerations.219 
Thirdly, in this day of political correctness, governmental decision-1nakers will 
be sure to hide any improper motives that may have contributed to their 
actions.220 Moreover, opponents of the discriminatory intent requirement 
argue that the negative impact of unequal treatment is felt by the affected 
co1nmunity regardless of whether that negative impact was caused by 
intentional or unintentional discrimination. 221 
217. 	 See Palmer v. Thompson, 40J U.S. 2 I 7, 224-25 (1971). Jusllce Alack slated; 
First, il 1s eJ1tremely difficult for a court to ascertain the rnot1vation, or collection of 
different moti~alion>, that lie behind a legislati~e enactn1cnt. It ;, difficult or 
unpossible for any court to detennine the "sole" or "do1ninant" motivation hehind the 
choice~ of a group of legislators. Furthennore, there is an element of futility in a judicial 
attempt to invalidate a law because of the bad motives of its supporters. If the law i> 
>!ruck down for this reason, rather than becau~e of 1L~ facial content or effect, it would 
pre~urnably be valid as soon as the legislature or relevant governing hody rcpasscd it for 
different reasons. 
Id. 
218 s,,e BULLARD, 111.pra note 13, at 15 (''In~ti1utional racism continues to affect policy 
decisions related to the enforcement or env!fonmenlal regulation>."); .1ee also Rebecca Hanner 
White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Maner:i?. Discrimination in .Wu/ti-Actor 
Emp/oy1nen1 De('ision Making, 61 LA. L Rr.v. 495, 530 (2001); Evan Tsen Lee & Ashutosh 
Bhag.... al, The McC/e:,·ky Puule: Rnnedying Pro:,·ecu.toria/ f)iscriminalion Against 13/ack Victims 
in Cilpital Sentenc:mg, 1<J98 SUP. C·1 REV. 145, 154-55 ( 1998); David A Strauss, Di.1criminatory 
Intent and the Ta1ning a/Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 956---58 (1989) (addressing The futility 
of inquiring if a group consciously decided lo engage in 1ntent1onal discriffilnation). 
219 See Ea>! Bibb Twiggs .\/eighborhood Ass'n v. J\.1acon-B1bb County Planning & :t-0ning 
Corrnn·n, 706 I-'. Supp. 880, 88J n 4 (M.D. Ga. 1989). According to the coun, on the record, 
three corrun1ssioncrs stated a neutral reason for voting in favor of or against the approval of !he 
landfill project. Id Co1nmis>ioner Pippinger contended that he voted to approve !he application 
after he reviewed "ail of tbe details[,] the use of the land and the facts and conclusions " Id. 
lo voting againsl the proJCCt. Corrunissioner Ingrarn stated that the proposed project did not 
satP.fy the need for a con1prchensive waste n1anagen1ent plan. Co1nrni>>ion Ingram a[,,o ohjecrcd 
to recon.1idcnng the application after it had already been denied. Id. Commissioner Cullinan 
voted lo grant the landfill permit and stated: "We can't rule on '>ites until they are brought to use. 
This site was brought to llS .... If others arc brought to us in North Macon, South Macon. West 
Macon, we have to be as deliberative and as thoughtful and 1nake an independent as.1ess1ncnt 
there to see whether in fact the land u~e is adequate." Id. 
220. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 319. 

22 J. Id. 
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A. A Few of the Proposed Alternatives to the Intent Requirement 
Since most discrimination is not blatant and decision-makers usually do 
not leave a paper trail showing discri1ninatory motive, it will continue to be 
difficult for environmental discrimination plaintiffs to meet the intent 
threshold. In addition, at the time the Court established conscious 
discriminatory intent as the standard equal protection plaintiffs had to meet, in 
many parts of the country overt racism was commonplace. 222 However, over 
the la~t few decades, society has indicated that overt racism will not be 
tolcratcd.223 Thus, in this day of political correctness,224 the incidences of 
overt racism by persons in the public eye are immediately condemned.225 
Today, most of the raci~m in the country is covert.226 Hence, the plaintiffs in 
equal protection cases have an almost insurmountable task when it comes to 
proving blatant intent to discriminate on the part of the governmental actor. 227 
Even if environmental discrimination plaintiffs are able to put together a 
forceful ca~e, the chance~ of winning arc slim because circumstantial evidence 
is capable of being interpreted in so many different ways. As a result, the 
environmental discrirnination plaintiff is forced to ~uffer tremendou~ hann on a 
d ·1 b . 228a1 y as1s. 
Regardless of the decision-maker's intent, minorities feel the impact of 
discriminatory environmental practices. It is of no help or solace to the 
communities whose children are poisoned by lead,229 or to familie~ 
222 5;,,,, Deana A_ Pollard, Uncon1ciou1 Bia1 and Self-Cntical Analysis: The Case for a 
Qualified l>'wdentiary l:'qual Employme111 Opportunity Privilege, 74 WASH. L. REV. 913. 928 
(1999); see also Richard Dvorak, Cracking the Code: "De-coding'" Colorblind Slurs During the 
Congressional Crack Cocaine Debates. 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 611. 617- J8 (2000). 
223. See Ruger I. Abran!S, Off His Rocker: Spons Discipline and Wbor Arbitration. 11 
MARQ. SPORTS L_ REV_ 167, 171 (2001)_ In evaluating the harshnes5 of John Rocker's 
punish1ncnt for making racist statements in a magazine interview, the author notes ··Rocker's wm; 
the harshest player discipline for off-work hchavior unconnected to mi ~conduct such as suhstancc 
abu~e an<l gambling.... Ty Cobb wa~ a notoriuu~ raci~t <luring a lime when the country accepted 
~uch sentunenb as natun!l an<l apprupnate." Id. 
224. See Charles R. Calleros. Reconciliu1ion of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties After R.A. V. 
v_ City of St. Paul. Free Speech, Antihurras~ment Pohcies. Multicultural Fducation, and Po/1t1cfll 
Cnrrectne.u at Arizona State lln1versi1y, 1992 UTAH L REV_ 1205. 1263---64 ( l 992)_ 
225. See Ross])_ Petty ct aL, Regulat1r1g Target il4arketing flnd Other Race-Bused Advert1.1Jng 
Practices. 8 MIC!!. J. RACE & L. 335. 337-338 (2003) (discus~1ng the treatment uf Trent Loll 
after his rernarks at Strom Thum1an"s birthday party). 
226. Jill E. E;ans. Challenging the Racism in Environn1ental Racism: Redefining the Concept 
ofIntent, 40 ARJ:t_ I _REV. 1219. 1275 ( l 99S)_ 
227. Id_ 

22S. See Ncl~on, supra note 211, at 344. 

229. See Jane Schukoske, The Evolving Paradigm ofWw.1 on Lead-Based Paint: Fro1n Code 
Violation to Environmental Hazard, 45 S.C. L. REV. 5 l l, 516 (1994 ). ''A <li.,proport1onalely high 
number of ethnic rninurity children live in poverty. in dilap1daced housing. and are poisoned by 
lead paint" frf_ (citing KARie:-. L. FLDl<IJ\l Lr AL, ENv·n._ DhHc:-.Sh Ft;:-.n, LFG>\CY OF LEAD: 
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experiencing various illnesses as a result of exposure to toxic emissions, that 
the polluter did not overtly single out minorities to be almost the exclusive 
recipients of the pollution.230 Moreover, the discriminatory intent requirement 
ignores the fact that racist decisions may be motivated by overt racism or the 
unconscious racist attitudes of the decision-maker. Numerous commentators 
have argued that proof of discriminatory intent dooms many equal protection 
cases because unconscious racism, on an individual and an institutional level, 
is widespread in our society. 231 
The criticism of the intent requirement has led to numerous suggestions for 
replacement standards. Some commentators have argued that the 
discriminatory intent requirement should be totally abandoned when legislative 
actions have a substantial disparate impact on a suspect class.232 Others, who 
disagree with the intent requirement, appear to oppose the standard of proof the 
plaintiffs have to meet to be successful. Thus, they have proposed alternatives 
that focus upon the type of information the plaintiffs should have to submit to 
prove discriminatory intent. 233 This section offers a brief summary of a few of 
the suggested proposals. 
AMERICA'S CONTINUING EPIDEMIC OF CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING, Appendix ! , Table A- l ). 
"In 1988, in metropolitan areas of more than one million, approximately 68% of black children 
and 36o/o of white children in households earning under $6,000 have blood lead levels in excess 
of fifteen milligrams per deciliter, in households with incomes between $6.000 and $14,999, the 
estimates arc 54% of black children and 23% of white children." Schukoske. supra. at 516-17 
n.30. 
230. According to a study released by the Citizens· Environmental Coalition. an advocacy 
group located in New York, minority neighborhoods are more likely than white neighborhoods to 
be the location of environmental hazards, including incinerators and bus depots. Paul H.B. Shin, 
A Cloud ()i.·er Minority Nobes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at 28. 
231. E.g., Valerie P. Mahoney, Environmental Justice: From Partial Victories To Complete 
Solutions, 21 CAROOZO L. REV. 361, 366 (1999); see also Marguerite A. Driessen, Toward a 
More Realistic Standard far Proving Discriminatory Intent, 12 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 
19, 41 (2002) (analyzing Charles Lawrence's notion that unconscious racism is "just as 
pernicious an evil as deliberate discrimination, and .. has no place in governmental action"); 
Colopy, supra note 33, at 151-52 (illustrating that a required showing of intent for redress in 
cases of institutional mcisn1 .. legitimizes the presumption that conscious racism is blameworthy 
but unconscious racism is not"); Boyle, supra note 213, at 938 (discussing how racist attitudes 
can unconsciously influence decisional actions and infonnational processing, contributing to the 
incomplete understanding of racial discrimination). 
232. See Boyle, supra note 213. at 980-81 {proposing the replacement of the intent 
requirement with an intenncdiate test in which plaintiffs would have co show that the actions of 
the government caused significant disparate impact on a suspect class). 
233. See Lawrence, supra note 200, at 355-58 (proposing that plaintiff submit data on 
"cultural meaning .. of a racially discriminatory act). 
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1. Abandonment of the Intent Requirement (Throwing Out the Baby) 
a. lntcr1nediatc Scrutiny Theory 
Commentator Ed\.vard P. Boyle proposes that courts abandon the intent 
standard and apply an intennediatc level of scrutiny to all legislative decisions 
that have a substantial disparate impact on suspect classes. 2 _i 4 In evaluating its 
decision, courts would ask whether the structure of the decision-making 
process was likely to generate a disparate racial outcome. 2:i.'i Under an 
intermediate-level scrutiny approach, the plaintiffs would first have to show 
that the govcrn1nental act had a significant disparate impact upon the suspect 
class of which they \Vere members. 236 The class members would 1neet that 
burden by sho\ving that an extraordinarily large number or percentage of class 
n1emhers were disadvantaged by the decision-makers' actions.237 If the class 
memhers did not meet their burden on the disparate impact issue, the decision~ 
n1akers would prevail. 238 In the event that the class members were able to 
sustain their burden of proof, the decision-makers could still defeat the class 
rne1nbers' claim by proving that a significant number or percentage of the 
persons si1nilarly impacted were not members of a su:-:.pcct cla,.s. If the court 
found the evidence of impact to be inconclusive, it would look at similar past 
actions by the decision-maker,. to detennine if any of tho5e prior decisions had 
a disparate racial impact.239 
If the class members succes,.fully demonstrated that only the 1nembcrs of 
their class suffered the disparate impact, the deci,.ion-makcrs would bear the 
burden of proving that the clao.s members' interests \.Vere represented 
adequately in the decision-making process. 240 The decision-makers could 
satisfy their burden by o.howing that the class representatives were p<ut of the 
decision-making procc,.s and that tho5e representatives were fully informed of 
the threat the dcci~ion posed to the cla~s mernbers. 241 Subsequently, the 
burden would shift to the class members to prove that their interests were 
inadequately represented or that the decision-making proce~s was dcfcctivc.242 
In evaluating the adequacy of reprc,.entation, the court would cono.idcr the 
following factors: (1) the number of suspect class rcprcsentative.5 \.vho were 
actually decision-makers or otherwise substantially involved in the decision­
making process: (2) the process by which the representatives were chosen; (3) 
234. See Boyle, .\·upra note 21lat98(}-81. 
235. Id. at 980. 
236. Id. 
23 7. Id. at 980--81. 
238. Id. at 981. 
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the level of communication between the impacted parties and their 
representatives; (4) the quality of information made available to those 
impacted and their representatives; (5) the amount of consideration that the 
decision-makers gave to less intrusive options; and (6) the incentives of the 
representatives, if any, that might have run counter to the interests of the 
impacted group.243 
The court's finding on the representation would detennine the level of 
scrutiny the court would apply to the challenged decision.244 If the court 
concluded that the interests of the impacted group were adequately represented 
and not hampered by deficiencies in the decision-making process, the decision­
makers would only have to show that they had a rational basis for making their 
decision.245 Conversely, if the court found that suspect class representatives 
did not adequately participate in the decision-making process, it would 
carefully examine the decision to detennine if the decision-makers had given 
adequate consideration to the interests of those impacted.246 The court would 
weigh the severity of the disparate impact on the class members against the 
extent of the inadequate representation and nature of the governmental interest 
at stake.247 Since, in most cases, the class members would lack access to 
evidence regarding the decision-making process, the court would presume that 
the decision-makers' decision was discriminatory because of the inadequate 
representation.248 The decision-makers could rebut this presumption by 
presenting evidence that they considered the impacted group's interests despite 
the inadequacy of representation or that the decision was supported by a 
compelling government interest.249 In order for the class members to support 
their case, they would submit evidence of discrimination in the decision­
making process along with a history of the decision-makers' actual 
discrimination.250 Under this test, the court's focus would be on whether the 
decision-making process sufficiently protected the concerns of the impacted 
class members.251 
The value of this proposed test is that it would require courts to do a 
thorough evaluation of the decision-making process instead of just focusing on 
the individual placement decision.252 This probing would benefit the plaintiff 
and the public. The plaintiff would benefit because a critical analysis of the 
243. Id. at 98!--&2. 
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decision-making proce.<.s is more likely to reveal evidence of racial bias on the 
part of the decision-maker. In addition, if persons making environmental siting 
decisions knew that the process, as well as the decision, was subject to judicial 
scrutiny, they would probably take precautions to ensure the fairness of the 
process. 
In the environmental context, this would mean that the decision-makers 
would take steps to ensure that members of the impacted community are 
represented in the decision-making process.253 Under the current system, 
decision-makers often choose to approve the placement of environmental 
hazards in the communities where they arc likely to encounter the least amount 
of resistance. If the interests of persons in minority communities are fully 
represented in the process, decision-rnakers may be hesitant to repeatedly place 
environmental hazards in their communitie.<.. 
Application of Boyle's proposed test would benefit the public because it 
would force the decision-makers to make more informed placement choices 
and to fully consider the consequences of their actions. Further, if the 
decision-making process does not have the appearance of impropriety, there 
may be a decline in the number of lawsuits filed against the governmental 
entity. Thus, the resources spent defending lawsuits may be available to fund 
projects that benefit the community. 
The main weakness of this proposed test is that it recommends that the 
court apply a standard that is less than strict scrutiny to cases involving 
allegations of racial discriinination. 254 In those types of cases, the government 
should always have to satisfy the strict scrutiny requirement. 255 Additionally, 
Boyle's theory may be just as burdenson1e on the environmental discrimination 
plaintiff as the current intent requirement. In order to meet his or her 
evidcntiary burden under Boyle's test, the plaintiff would have to submit a 
large amount of detailed information to the court. If the plaintiff has access to 
that kind of information, he or she would probably be able to satisfy the 
discriminatory intent requirement as it i5 currently applied. 
The problem minorities face is the cumulative impact of the placement of 
several environmental hazards in their co1nmunities. ·rherefore, any legal tool 
that permits court5 to evaluate the decision-making process instead of the 
isolated placement decision will be beneficial to persons fighting 
environmental discrimination. On balance, implementation of Boyle's test 
253. See id. al 984-87 (analyling two examples of possible inadequate representation of a 
suspect class under the intennediate scrutiny theory). 
254. See Hoyle, ~upro. note 2ll at 981-82 (propo>ing that rhe court apply a rational hasis or 
intcnncdiatc scrutiny standard when evaluating a case depending on the facts). 
255. See John~on v. California, 125 S.Ct. 2410. 2419 (2005) (discussing the importance of 
applying strict scrutiny in case~ involving govemment-unposed racial clas~1fications). 
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\vould provide niore benefit~ than burJens tu Lhc persons conihating 
environmental di~crimination. 
b. Environmental Tort Theory 
Professor Kathy Seward Northern propose,. creating a new tort to deal with 
environmental discrimination issues.2-' 0 The tort would be the "intent to cause 
. II d. . . I b d " 257 U d racta y 1sproport1onate exposure to env1ronmcnta ur ens. n er 
Professor Northem's theory, an owner or operator of an environmental hazard 
would he subject to liability if his intentional conduct imposed a ·'racially 
8disproportionate environmental burden."2-' The owner or operator would be 
liable for "resulting bodily harm, mental distress, or property damage."259 The 
plaintiff would have to prove that the owner or operator intended to impo,.e the 
racially disproportionate environmental burden.260 
Professor J\1orthern propo~es using a different definition of intent thllil the 
one that is currently required in equal protection cases. 261 The proposed 
replacement definition of intent would be based upon tort law principles.202 
Thus, in the context of this new tort, intent would include a purpose or desire 
to bring about a given consequence llild a subst<mtial certainty that such a 
consequence would occur.201 Courts would apply a reasonable person standard 
in evaluating whether the defendant had the necessary intent.204 Therefore, if a 
reasonable person in the actor's position believed that his action was 
substantially certain to cause a harmful or offensive contact, the defendant 
would be lreatcd as though he had inlendcd thal result. 265 
()ne purpose of Professor Nortbem's proposed tort is to encourage owners 
and operators of facilities currently located in minority co1nmunitic5 to con1ply 
fully with environ1nental regulation5. 266 A second purpose is to discourage 
owners and operators of environmental hazards from concentrating such 
hazards 1n minority cornmunities and from placing the hazards in 
geographically or geologically unsuitable areas.267 
If Professor '.\Jorthem's proposal is adopted, it will provide more option~ 
for person~ co1nbating environmental discri1nination. The environmentally 
256. Northem supra note 15, al 577-78. 
257. Id. at 578­
258. Id. 
259. Id. 
260. See id. 







264. See id. at 574. 
265. Id. 
266. Northem. i-upro note !S, at 578-79_ 
267_ Id. 
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discriminated-against plaintiff will benefit from the application of tort law 
because tort law has a more expansive definition of intent. In tort law there is 
a presumption that a person intends the natural and probable consequences of 
his action.268 Therefore, intent is attributed to a person if he or she acted with 
purpose or design or with substantial certainty that the result would occur.269 
Expansion of the definition of intent will enable courts to consider unconscious 
racism. As a consequence, decision-makers will give more consideration to 
the impact their decisions may have on minority communities.270 
Another positive aspect of Professor Northern's theory is that it would 
place the financial burden on the entities that are directly responsible for the 
disproportionate placement of the environmental hazard. The owner or 
operator of the facility causing the harm should have to compensate the 
plaintiffs. Owners and operators are in the best position to make sure that a 
facility is as environment-friendly as possible. Those persons are also the ones 
with the most information about the impact an environmental hazard will have 
on members of the community. 
One of the drawbacks of relying on tort law to remedy the disproportionate 
placement of environmental hazards in minority communities is that the 
plaintiffs will be deprived of the protections that minority persons receive in 
constitutional cases. Thus, the standard that decision-makers will have to meet 
to justify their actions will be less stringent. In addition, the remedies available 
under tort law may be limited. The primary remedy available under tort law is 
usually damages.271 In environmental cases, the plaintiffs may not suffer 
damages until several years after they have been exposed to the hazards. At 
that time, the statute of limitations may prevent the plaintiffs from bringing a 
cause of action.272 Moreover, the plaintiffs' initial injuries may be minor. 
268. Cheek v. Hamlin, 277 N.E.2d 620, 634 (Ind. Ct. App. 1972). 
269. "Substantial certainty" has been described as more than "mere knowledge and 
appreciation of a risk." Pariseau v. Wedge Prods., Inc., 522 N.E.2d 511, 514 (Ohio 1988) 
(quoting W, PAGE KEETOJ\, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E, KEETON & DAVID G. 0\\'El\, PROSSER 
AND KEETON ON TORTS 36 (5th ed. 1984)). 
270. The possibility of tort liability may serve as a deterrent to decision-makers who are 
inclined to place environmental hazards in minority communities chat arc already heavily 
polluted. See Northern, supra note 15, at 578-79. 
271. JERRY J. PHILLIPS ET AL, TORT LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, PROHLE\iS 607 (3d ed. 
2002). 
272, ARTHUR BEST & DAVID W. BARl'ES. BASIC TORT LAW: CASES, STATUTES, AND 
PROBLEM5 344 (2003). "A stallJte of limitations relates 10 the lime a plaintiff should reasonah\y 
have known that he or she had a legal claim and bars a claim unless it is filed within a certain 
penod after that time.'" Id.; see also GEORGE C. CHRISTIE ET AL., CASES AND MATER!ALS ON 
THELAWOFTORTS775(3ded. 1997). 
In many jurisdictions, the typical two-year ton statute of limitations is a clock chat starts 
running on the date of "injury" or "'occurrence." If "occurrence" could be understood to 
mean the date of exposure, or if '"injury" could be interpreted as the first time when the 
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However, after the case has been litigated and resolved, the plaintiff may suffer 
further damages. The plaintiffs may be barred from seeking damages from an 
injury that occurred as a result of the previously litigated incident.273 Given 
the changes that have occurred because of tort reform, the use of tort law may 
be a limited solution to the problem of the inequitable placement of 
environmental hazards. 274 
Nonetheless, implementation of the proposed environmental tort would 
give the minority community another weapon to fight the disproportionate 
placement of environmental hazards in their neighborhoods. Given the lack of 
success plaintiffs have had utilizing the Equal Protection Clause, the 
availability of a tort cause of action would be a welcomed addition to the legal 
landscape. 
2. Modification of the Intent Requirement (Changing the Bathwater) 
a. Cultural Meaning Theory275 
According to Professor Charles Lawrence, unconscious racism results 
because "Americans share a common historical and cultural heritage in which 
racism has played and still plays a dominant role. Because of this shared 
experience, we also inevitably share many ideas, attitudes, and beliefs that 
attach significance to an individual's race and induce negative feelings and 
opinions about nonwhites."276 Professor Lawrence proposes replacing the 
discriminatory intent requirement with a cultural meaning test that focuses 
upon unconscious racism.277 In applying the test, courts would look to see if 
to~ic substance begins to have any physiological effects, then the plaintiff might find that 
the clock has run out by the time she actually contracts the disease. 
Id. 
273. See CHRISTIE ET AL, supra note 272, at 775 ("Under traditional tort rules, a plaintiff 
may not 'split' her claim and later seek future damages in a different suit. Rather, she must bring 
her suil within the statute of limitations, and then seek in that suit all damages flowing from 1ha1 
injury:'). 
274. See generally Lucinda M. Finley, The Hidden Victim~ of Ton Refonn: Women, Children, 
and rhe Elderly, 53 EMORY LJ, 1263 (2004) (discussing the damage caps es1ablished under new 
tort reform measures). See also CHRISTIE ET AL, supra note 272, at 904-17. 
275. In his !994 article, Marco "'1asoni, then a student at Georgetown University Law Center, 
applied the cultural meaning test to an environmental discrimination case. As the result of his 
analysis, Masoni concluded that "[t]he cultural meaning test forces one to lake a hard look at a 
case and, if necessary, probe beneath the apparent neutrality of decisions which 
disproportionately impact minorities." Marco Masoni, The Green Badge ofSlavery, 2 GEO. J. ON 
FIGHTING POVERTY 97, 113 (1994). 
276. Lawrence, supra note 200, at 322. 
277. id. at 355--62. 
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the governmental action conveyed a symbolic message to which the culture 
attaches racial significance.278 
As a part of that analysis, the court would consider evidence regarding the 
historical and social context in which the decision was made and 
implemented.279 If, based upon that review, the court decides by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a significant portion of the population 
would think of the governmental action in racial terms, the court would 
presume that "socially shared, unconscious racial attitudes made evident by the 
action's meaning had influenced the decisionmakers."280 As a consequence, 
the court would infer discriminatory intent and apply heightened scrutiny.281 
To illustrate his theory, Profes~or Lawrence gave the example of a 
government decision to construct a wall between white and black 
communities. 282 According to Profe..,sor Lawrence, the construction of the 
wall would have a "cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites' 
need to separate themselves from blacks as a symbol of their superiority."283 
Since the construction of the wall would conjure up racial inferiority, it would 
burden blacks living in the affected communities and reinforce a system of 
racial discrimination.284 Therefore, the blacks in those communities should not 
have to prove discriminatory intent in order to get judicial redress because the 
court should assume that the decision to construct the wall wa.., based upon 
285 
race. 
This test could provide some salvation for persons trying to combat 
environmental discrimination. In order to get around the discriminatory intent 
requirement, the plaintiff would have to prove that the deci~ion to place the 
environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood had a cultural meaning that 
was based upon the race of the persons living in the impacted area. The 
placement of an environmental hazard in a minority neighborhood could have 
a cultural meaning growing out of a long history of whites' beliefs that 
minority neighborhoods are not fit for anything other than dumping. 286 In 
addition. the placement of environmental hazards in a predominately minority 




281 Lawrence. ~upra note 200, at 356. 

282. Id. at 357. 
283. Id. 
284. Id. at 358. 
285. See id. al 356-58. 
286. See BULLARD, ;·upra note 13, m 5 (discussing the fad that toxic durnps and other local!y 
unwanted land u-;c<; (LULU~) have hi:,torically hccn placed in minonty and lo...,,·-1nco111e 
communilie>). 
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neighborhood may further promote the opinion that minorities arc "second 
class" citizens who do not deserve to live in clean, safe neighborhoods.287 
The cultural meaning test may impose a heavy burden on the plaintiff. In 
some situations, that burden rnay be just as arduous as the one environmental 
discrimination plaintiffs currently face when trying to prove discri1ninatory 
intent. The burden of proof will be difficult to meet because the cultural 
meaning test employs a subjective standard. 288 A person's background and life 
experiences will impact the meaning that he or she gives to a particular action. 
In the environmental arena. the negative cultural meaning that is attached to a 
placement decision will not be as apparent as in segregation cases. Therefore, 
in order to prove the cultural n1eaning attached to a particular placement 
decision, the plaintiff would have to acquire the services of an expert such as a 
cultural anthropologist. Low-income persons and n1inorities usually do not 
have the financial resources to hire expert witnesses. In addition, since cultural 
anthropology is not an exact science, the case may be con1plicated by a battle 
of expert witnesses. Another concern is that the cultural meaning test may be 
considered vague and speculative because it does not state the objective 
parameters that are necessary to prove cultural meaning. 
Ulti1nately, the cultural meaning test is preferable to the current method of 
deterrnining intent in environmental discrimination cases. Application of the 
cultural meaning test will allow the court to expose unconscious racisn1. crhc 
cultural meaning test may also be used as a tool for educating decision-maker~ 
about unconscious racism. Most decision-makers may be unaware that their 
underlying biases are inf1uencing the choices they make in their official 
capacities. Acknowledgn1ent of the cultural 1neaning pheno1ncnon 1nay lead 
decision-makers to take steps to make the process more inclusive. Initially, it 
1nay be difficult to attach cultural meaning to government actions, however, 
after a few cases, the necessary data will be available for use by future 
plaintiffs. 
b. Reversing the Groups 'fheory 
Professor David Strauss proposes what he calls a "reversing the groups" 
test.289 The test would be used to define what discrin1inatory intent means. 
Under the test, courts would ask the following question: Would the 
government actor have made the same decision if he had known that the 
challenged governmental action would have adversely impacted whites instead 
287. SPe id. (citing Robert Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, Environmentalism and 1he 
Polilics of lc"quity: Fn1er,;ent Trend.1 in lhP Black Community, 12 MID-Al\1. REV. Of' SOC 21, 28 
(1987), and emphasi7ing that the disdain for rninunt1cs led lo the ·'Place in Blacks' Back Yard'" 
(PIBBY) pnnciple). 
288 See Lawrence, ;;upra note 200. at 355-56. 
289. Strauss, supra note 218, at 956-59. 
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of blacks?290 Another way to put the question is: Would the government have 
made a decision that negatively affected the plaintiffs if they were members of 
a different race? If the answer to the question is no, the court should decide 
that the decision was made with discriminatory intent. 291 
If this test is applied to an environmental discrimination case, courts would 
ask: Would the government actor have decided to place the environmental 
hazard in the community if the population of the community was 
predotninately white? In order to meet his or her burden of proof under this 
test, the environmental discrimination plaintiff would have tu ~how that the 
decision-maker chose to place the hazard in a 1ninurity neighborhood even 
though there was a non-minority neighborhood suitable for the project. 
Application of this test would have been helpful to the plaintiffs in the East 
Bibb case because they had evidence that the county had previou!>ly refused to 
site the landfill in a predominately white neighborhood.292 The shortcoming of 
the proposed test is the fact that the court may not be able to determine the true 
answer to the question becau~e the government actors can always come up 
with a non-discriminatory reason for environmental placement decisions. 
Like under the current intent requirement, the "reversing the groups" test 
will place the plaintiff in the difficult position of attempting to attribute a 
single motive to a group of people. Nonetheless. the "reversing the groups" 
theory will force decision-makers to at least consider non-minority areas when 
they are making placement decisions. Having to answer the question posed by 
this theory in court may be an incentive for decision-makers to consider factors 
other than race when selecting locations for environmental hazards. 
3. My Fair Share Theory 
The cement that holds our society together is the belief that the foundation 
1
of our society is justice.29· True justice cannot be achieved if burden~ are 
placed on a few persons in order to benefit the majority of the population.294 I 
arrived at my theory by relying on the readings of John Rawls. In A lheory of 
290. Id. at 956-57. 

291 Id. at 957_ 

292_ East Hihh Twiggs r-.·e1ghborhood Ass'n v. :vlai.:on-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 

Cu1nrn'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M_D_ Ga_ 1989). 
293. In A Theory of Justice, John Rai,vls slates, "[A] society is well-ordered when it is not only 
designed to advance the good of it~ 1nembers but when it is also cffectivdy regulated by a pub he 
conception of JUStice." JOHN RAWLS, A TH!·.ORY OF JL;STICE 4 (rev. ed., The Belknap Preso; of 
Harvard Univcro;ity Press 1999) (1971). 
294_ Id. at 3. 
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Justice, John Rawls characterizes justice as faimess. 295 Hence, a society 
cannot be just without a concept of fairness. 296 According to Rawls: 
297[A] person is required to do his part as defined by the rules of an institution
when two conditions are met: first, the institution is just (or fair). that is, it 
298
satisfies the two principles of JUS!iee; and second. one has voluntarily 
accepted the benefits of the arrangement or taken advantage of the 
299
···reers to rher one s interests. opportunities 11 o urt ·· 
Rawls explains that, in a situation where a group of persons are 
cooperating to achieve a goal, all of the persons should make sacrifices, 
including restricting their liberties, to benefit the group as a whole. In that 
circumstance, the members of the group will be equally burdened and equally 
benefited.~00 Rawls concludes, "We are not to gain from the cooperative 
labors of others without doing our fair share."301 In the land use context, the 
concept of fair share developed as a potential solution to exclusionary 
'°'Idd·h· fl ..zoning. n a ress1ng t e issue o exc ustonary zoning, one court 
determined that each community has an obligation to take its "fair share" of 
low-income persons:103 In the environmental law context, each comJnunity has 
the responsibility to take its fair share of the environmental hazards located in 
the area.3i:» 
295. Id. at 10. 
296. Id. at 11 Rawls states that the theory of '·'jus!Jce as faimes.1' .. convey;, the nlea that 
the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that i;, fair." Id. 
297. Rawb refers to an institution a;, "a public system of rules which define; offices and 
positions with the If rights and duties. powers and innnunitics, and the like." id. at 4 7. 
298. 	 The rwo principles of iustice for institutions arc the following: 
FIRST PRINCIPLE 
Each per1on is 10 have an equal nght to the most exten;ive total ;ys1em of equal ba;ic 
liberties compatihle with a sinnlar .-.y"1cn1 of liberty for all. 
SECOND PRINCIPLE 
Social and economic inequalities are lo be arranged so that they arc both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the leas! advantaged, consistent with the just savings 
pnnciple, and 
(h) attached 10 office; and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of 
opportunity. 

RAWLS, supra note 293, al 266. 

299. Id. at 96. 
300. Id. (citing H.L A Hart, Are There Any Natur,,/ Rights?, 64 PHIL. REV. I 85f ( 1955)). 
301. Id. at 96. 
302. "Exclu~ionary zoning" refer.-. to the practice of closing an entire community to unwanted 
group.1 such as low-income and rn1nonty persons. Richard lliompson Ford, The Boundaries of 
Race: Po/iricai (;eogrophy in legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841, 1870 ( 1994). 
303. See S. Burlington County NAACP v. Twp of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713, 724-25 (N.J. 
1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975). 
304. When discussing ··rair treatment,"' the Environmental Protection Agency states that "no 
group of people, including raciaL ethnic. or soc1~conomic group 5hould bear a di~proportionatc 
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Because it is the antithesis of fairness, discrimination is a tennite that eats 
at the foundation of society. Therefore, in order for our society to remain 
intact, all forms of discrimination 1nust be exterminated. The Equal Protection 
Clause was enacted to eliminate discrimination by not allowing similarly 
situated persons to be treated differently.305 Consequently, the quest for justice 
should be the desire of all courts, especially when reviewing an allegation of 
discrimination. 
In the United States, it is clear that environmental hazards are not 
distributed equally. 306 Under the current system, the facilities needed to 
provide services for the entire community are usually placed in areas 
containing populations that are mostly low-income and minority.:io7 Thus, 
low-income and minority persons bear the burden of environmental pollution 
while the majority of the population receives the benefits provided by the 
8pollution producing facilitics. 3n Despite recognition of the fact that low­
1ncome and minority persons are disproportionately impacted by 
environmental pollution, persons seeking a remedy 1n an environmental 
discrimination case have to overcome a big hurdle-proving discriminatory 
intent.309 They must prove that the government actors who made the decision 
to place the environmental hazard in their community were motivated by 
. . . . 310d1scnm1natory intent. 
<;hare of the negali~c environn1ental consequences resulting from indu<,lnal. municipal, and 
comn1ercial operations or the execution uf federal, state, local, and tnbal programs and policies."' 
Suzanne Smith, Note, Current Treatnli'nt of f."nvironmenla/ Justice Claim;_ Plo.intiffs Face a 
Oead End in the Courtroo"1, 12 B.U. PL'B_ II\T. L.J. 223, 223 (2002) (quoting EPA, INTERIM 
FINAL GUIDAl'C!-. FOR l'.\'CORPORATING ENVIROJ\"\.1!-.I\"IAL Jus·11C1: CON("!-RNS IN El'A's NEPA 
CUMPLIA"l("E Al\Al.YS!S 2 ( 1997))_ 
305. See Green v_ City of Tucson. 340 F.3d 89l. 896 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing City of Clehumc 
v_ Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 ( 1985)). 
306. See Moh~u & Rryanl. supra note 27, at 921-22_ 
307 For example, in New York Stale, '·communities with a minority population of at leas! 70 
percent have ahouc 18 percent of the state's air pollution site~ hut only make up ahout .5 percent 
of the land area."' Danita Chambers, Pollution High Where fncome ls Low, TIMES UNIOK, :\1.ar_ 
12, 2004, at 83; :,·ee also Jay Rey, Watchdog Group Accu.~e.~ State of £nvironn1ental Ro.cism, THL 
BUFFALO NEWS, Mar. 12, 2004, at B22 (discussing the fact that in New York State, 1nembers of 
"minority communitic<; are expo~cd tu a disproportionate anmunt of air pollution .."). 
308. See Harvey L_ White, Race, C/a:,s, and Environmel!to.l Hazards, in ENVIR0'.\''\.1EN rAL 
]'.\'JCSTICES, POLITICAL STRlJGGLl::S 65, 67 (David E. Camacho ed., 1998) (stating that "1n 
Detroit, a person of color'; chance of Jiving i,11ithin a mik of a hazardous wa;Ce facility is four 
tnnes greater than a white American's"). 
309. See R.I.S.E., Inc_ v. Kay, 768 F. Supp. 1144, 1149 (EJ)_ Va. 1991); :,ee also Luke W. 
Cole & Shelia R. Foster, FROM THE GROUND UP: ENVIROJ\'MENTAL RACISM AND THE RISE Or 
THE [NV1R0!\'\.1LVI ALJCSTICE MOVEJ\-11-'N"I 64 (2001). 
310. Ea<,t Bihh Ti,>1igg'> 1'eighborhood Ass'n v. Macon-Bibb County Planning & Zoning 
Connn'n, 706 F. Supp. 880, 884 (M.D. Ga. 1989). 
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The di~criminatory intent requirement is such a high standard that it flies in 
lhe face of fairness and prevents plaintiffs in environmental discrimination 
cases from receiving _justice. Nonethcle~s, I am not proposing that the 
discriminatory intent requirement be replaced with a different standard. A 
legal standard should not be thrown out simply because it is applied in a 
manner that disadvantages one side. I am proposing that the courts change the 
manner in which they evaluate whether or not the plaintiff has proven 
discriminatory intent. 
A disparate impact standard would tilt the table too heavily in favor of the 
plaintiffs in environ1nental discrimination cases. It is usually pretty easy to 
prove disparate impact because it is well documented that minorities are 
disproportionately impacted by environmental hatards. 311 Disparate impact 
usually becomes a problem when the community feels the cumulative impact 
of several environmental hazards. 1'hus, application of a disparate impact 
standard would require current decision-makers to be held accountable for the 
. f h . d ••actions o t e1r pre ecessors. 
Current decision-maker~ should not be held responsible for past decisions 
to place environmental hazards unless they acted with knowledge that their 
placement decision would make the situation worse. A person should only be 
held liable if there is some level of culpability on his or her part. In order to be 
held liable under the Equal Protection Clause, the persons who 1nade the 
challenged decision should have some actual knowledge or attributable 
knowledge of the harm their action would cause to persons living in the 
impacted neighborhood. On the other hand, strict application of the 
discrin1inatory intent standard places an onerous burden on the environmental 
discrimination plaiotiff and advantages the decision-makcr.313 
The intent standard should be maintained to avoid holding persons liable 
for harms they did not intend to cause. Nonetheless, intent should be defined 
broadly enough to encompass both conscious and unconscious racisin.314 The 
underlying basis of my proposal is faimess 315 and social cooperation.316 
311. See Centner el al., supra note 32, at 127-28. 
312. Lawrence, :,·upra note 200, at 320. 
313. See '\ilitchell A. Horv.·ich, Coinment, Title VI aj the 1964 Civil Right:,· Act and the 
C/u:,ing ofa Public Hv;pital, 1981 !JUKE L.J. 1033. I043-45 (1981 ). 
314. Lawrence. supra note 200, at 324-25. 
315. See RA\VLS. supra note 293, at 301--08 (discussing why fairness is of great imponance in 
aJUSt <,OCJety). 
316. See John Rawb. The Basic Liben1es and Their Priority, in LIBERTY, EQUALITY, AND 
LAW 2. 14 (Sterling M. McMurrined.. 1987). 
The notion of social cooperation is not sirnply thal of coordinated social activity 
efficiently organized and guided hy publicly recognized rules to achieve some overall 
end. Social cooperation i~ always for mutual benefit and this implies that it involve~ two 
elements: the first i~ a shared notion of fair tenns of cooperation. which each panicipanl 
rnay reasonably be expected lo ac1.:ept, provided that everyone else likewise accepts Chern. 
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Fairness should play a part in any equal protection analysis because the 
amendment was enacted to address the issue ofinequality. 317 
For years, the United States was segregated on the basis of race and class. 
Persons relied on the Equal Protection clause to remedy the harms caused by 
segregation.318 Currently, a significant number of minority persons are being 
segregated in neighborhoods that arc plagued with environmental hazards.319 
Those persons should be able to more readily avail themselves of the 
safeguards afforded by the Equal Protection Clause. 
Currently, the courts rely on the Arlington Heixhts factors to determine if 
the plaintiffs have made a prima facie case of dis~riminatory intcnt:120 A~ a 
result, the courts refuse to apply strict scrutiny unless the plaintiff proves that 
di~criminatory intent was the motivating factor behind the government 
· 
321 I . . h f . d. th I haction. t 1s my contenllon t at a1mess 1ctates at courts eva uate t e 
rea5onab\cness322 of the decision to place the environmental hazard in a cenain 
Fair tenn~ of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and rnutuality: all whn 
cooperate musl henefit, or >hare in comrnon hurdens, in sornc appropriate fa;hion Judged 
hy a suitable benchmark of compari-;on. 
Id. 
317. See Deborah l:lellrnan. The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protertion, 85 M1K._. L. REV. 
1, 8 (2000) (claiming that the Equal Protedion Clause 1nandate\ that the govemn1ent 
demonstrate> equal concern for all c1l1lens): see a/:io Wa<;hington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 
(1976) (stating thal "[t]he central pLirpose of the r.qual Protection Clause of the 1-'ouncenlh 
Amendn1ent i<; the prevention of official conduct di<;crirn1nating mi the hasis of race"): Jay S. 
Bybee. 11w Equal Proce.\'.\ Clause. A Nole .:1n the (Non)Rf'lation~hip Between Romer v. Evans 
and Hunter v. Erickson, 6 WM. & :'vlARY BlLL RTS. J. 201, 205 (1997); Jean1nane K. Grubert, 
Note, 1he Rehnqui:it Court':i C!wnged Reading of the F:qua/ Pro1ection Clause in the Context of 
Voting Right.i, 65 1-'0RDllAM L. REV. 1819, 1843-44 (1997). 
318. r;.g., Brov.•u v. Hd. of Educ., 347 G.S. 481, 495 (1954) ("[Tjhe plaintiffs and others 
~imilarly situated for whotu the actions have hecn brought are, by rcasun of the 1egregation 
cornplmned of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amcndnient.''); .i·ee also Palmer v. Thou1pson, 403 l'.S. 217 (1971) (holding that a city which 
closed public swiu1ming pools rather than try lo operate thern as dc>egrcgatcd did not deny equal 
protection). 
319. Rohert J)_ Bullard, Envirunrnental Justice for All, in Cl\'EQUAL PROTECT!ON: 
ENVIROKME:\TAL JUSTK'~, A:>;D C0'\1'l'It:Nn·1~,S OJ' COLOR 3, 11 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994) 
(sl<1.t1ng !h<1.t "[n]umcrous studiesl,I dating back to the 1970.1, reveal that con1n1unitic5 of color 
have bome greater health and environmental risk burden> than has 50cicty at large"); see a/:io 
White, :iupra note 308, at 68---69 (di.1cuss1ng the national paucrn of low-1ncornc and 1n1norities 
being disproportionately exposed to environniental ha7ards). 
320. Vil!. of Arlington Height> v. Metro. Housing Dev Corp., 429 L'.S. 252, 266---68 (1977): 
see also John;on v Bd. of Educ., 188 F. Supp 2d 944, 970 (C.D. lll. 2002). 
321. See, e.i;., Anderson ex rel. Dowd v. City of Boston, 375 F.3d 7!, 82 (lstCir 2004). 
322. 	 According to John Rav.·ls, 
[R]casonahle per<;ons arc charactenzed in two ways: Fir>l, they stand ready to offer fair 
terms of social cooperation hetween equab, and the} abide by the.1e term5 if others do 
also, even :.hould it be to their advantage not to: 1econd, reasonable per;on.1 recognize and 
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area when deciding the issue of discriminatory intent. To equalize the process, 
the court~ should apply an objective reasonableness test to determine if the 
decision-maker may have been motivated by the intent to discriminate. If the 
plaintiffs arc able to show that the decision to place the environmental hazard 
in their neighborhood was presumptively unreasonable, the burden should shift 
to the decision-makers to prove that they were not motivated by discriminatory 
intent. 
Under the test I propose, like in the current system, the initial burden of 
proof would be on the plaintiff to prove the placement decision has a disparate 
impact on a community predominately populated by persons from one racial or 
ethic group:123 'rhe next step would be for the court to ask the following 
question: Was it reasonable to place the environmental hazard in the plaintiff's 
neighborhood? In answering the question, the court would start with the 
premise that it is unreasonable to place an environmental hazard in an area that 
is already oversaturated with environmental hazards. The plaintiff has the 
burden of proving that his/her neighborhood was oversaturatcd when the 
government actor made the decision to place the new environmental hazard in 
the area. In order to show over-saturation, the plaintiff must present evidence 
indicating the percentage of the conimunity that lives in the impacted area. 
Then. the plaintiff must show the percentage of the community's 
environmental hazards324 that arc located in the area. If the plaintiff proves 
that, prior to the placement decision, the percentage of the ha1:ards bore by 
his/her neighborhood was significantly higher than the percentage of the 
community's population living in the neighborhood, he/she has proven 
oversaturation. For example, if the impacted neighborhood 1nakcs up twenty 
percent of the community's population and contains sixty-five percent of the 
environrnental hazards located in the co1nmunity, a court should consider the 
area to be over5aturated. An alternative method for detennining over!-.aturation 
rnay be to focus on the level of pollution in the impacted community. This 
would cover the case!> where a community with fewer environmental hazards 
has niore pollution. For instance, a community with two chemical plants may 
be more polluted than a community with four landfills. 
()nee an area i~ cla!-.~ified as being oversaturated, there should be a 
presumption it is unrea!-.onable to place another environmental hazard in the 
area. Courts should presume that an unreasonable placement decision was 
accept the consequence~ ol the burdens of judgrnent, which lead> to rhc idea of reasonable 
toleration in a dcn1ocratic socicry. 
JOH.'! RA\VLS, THI: L,\WS Or Pl'.OPLES 177 (1999) (citation<; omitted). Ba<;cd upon Rawls's 
observations, it i<; my contention that rea~onable persons n1akc reasonable decisions that arc frur. 
Tiu1<;, !he actions of dccision-makcr:s should be evaluated u<;ing a rea.>onablenes; ,,tandard. 
323 s,,e United State<; v. !!arc, 308 F. Supp. 2d 955, 991-92 (D. Neb. 2004). 
324_ Environ111ental haL:ards should be broadly defined to include businesses like gas station> 
and -.alvagc yards that reqllire go~emmcnt permission to operate in a certain area. 
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motivated by discriminatory intent. In order for a court to make the 
presumption, the plaintiff must prove that the decision-maker knew or should 
have known about the racial make-up and the over-saturation of the selected 
area. Finally, the decision-makers will have the opportunity to rebut the 
presumption. The decision-makers may be able to rebut the presumption by 
proving that the placement of the new hazard in the community did not make 
the level of pollution in the area any worse. To prove this point, the decision­
makers will have to rely upon objective scientific and statistical data. 
The fair share test is not a cure-all for environmental discrimination 
plaintiffs. It still requires them to obtain and submit large volumes of 
information. However, the information is easily acquired through discovery, 
investigative techniques, and public hearings. Further, the test only focuses 
upon the placement of additional environmental hazards and does not provide a 
mechanism for removing hazards from minority communities. Nonetheless, 
the fair share theory is a step towards easing the burdens on minorities. 
CONCLUSION 
The discriminatory intent requirement has caused problems for plaintiffs in 
environmental discrimination cases. Nonetheless, the requirement of intent for 
proving discrimination has not lost its usefulness. Hence, the intent 
requirement should not be discarded as the foundation of an equal protection 
case. Instead courts should change the manner in which they apply the intent 
standard. Presently, courts look for evidence of purposeful, conscious intent to 
discriminate when deciding if a government actor has violated the Equal 
Protection Clause in siting an environmental hazard. Courts should view 
"intent" through a broader lens in order to identify situations where the 
government action was motivated by an unconscious intent to discriminate on 
the part of the decision-maker. 
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